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1.1  Motivation 
The United States (US) has been producing radioactive waste for over 70 years, beginning with 
the Manhattan project in 1941 and continuing to the present day (US Department of Energy, 
1996a; Gosling, 2010).  This waste comes from a number of sources, such as the production of 
nuclear weapons, production of nuclear power, research on new applications for radioisotopes 
and their use in medical applications, and from the cleanup of contaminated material (US 
Department of Energy, 1997a).  Over the past decades proper and safe disposal of these diverse 
waste streams has proven to be a major challenge for the US and the international community.  
The unique hazards posed by radioactive wastes require that the waste remain isolated for a 
sufficient period of time, in order to adequately protect the public and environment from harm.  
The amount of time depends on the quantity and half-life of the radionuclides present.   
High-level and high activity radioactive waste (HLW) such as reprocessed nuclear fuel needs to 
be isolated deep underground for tens of thousands of years in a geologic repository (US 
Department of Energy, 1997a).  Low level radioactive waste (LLW) can be buried closer to the 
surface, in special engineered disposal facilities, which combine different types of natural and 
engineered barriers to keep the waste isolated and prevent it from migrating into the surrounding 
environment (EG&G Idaho, 1994; National Research Council, 2007; Westinghouse Savannah 
River Company (WSRC), 2008).  Typically these facilities need to perform for 1,000 years, a 
significant challenge considering there is approximately 70 years of experience working with 
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LLW disposal.  Performance of LLW disposal facilities is based upon meeting a set of 
performance objectives.  These objectives are designed to provide an adequate level of protection 
from the radiological hazards of buried waste by limiting the total amount of disposed waste in 
each facility.  
The hazardous nature of LLW and the 1,000 year period of compliance dictates that a detailed 
analysis of facility performance be conducted before the start of waste disposal, and updated 
throughout the operation of the facility.  This is accomplished by conducting a [radiological] 
Performance Assessment (PA), a form of systematic risk analysis used to answer four 
fundamental questions: “ (i) what can happen; (ii) how likely is it to happen; (iii) what are the 
resulting impacts; (iv) and how these impacts compare to regulatory standards” (Eisenberg et al., 
1999; US NRC, 2000).   The DOE defines a PA as “an analysis of a radioactive waste disposal 
facility conducted to demonstrate there is a reasonable expectation that performance 
objectives…will not be exceeded following closure of the facility” (US Department of Energy, 
1999c).   
While each PA is different based on the requirement of the regulating agency and the preferences 
of the authoring organization, there is a logical progression of steps to any PA (Case and Otis, 
1988).  The first step is to establish the scope of the analysis within the PA and highlight the 
performance objectives (Shott et al., 1998).  The second step is a characterization of all relevant 
site data (e.g., climate and geology), projected waste inventory, and proposed engineered barrier 
design.  This is followed by the actual analysis of disposal facility performance.  Results are used 
to establish performance-based disposal concentration limits, identity future data needs, and 
provide a basis for future research to reduce uncertainties in the PA. 
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Within the analysis of the PA, site engineers and staff must make a number of design decisions 
for the disposal facility based on the proposed inventory, current best practices, and expert 
opinion.  These engineered disposal facilities incorporate a number of components selected to 
isolate waste from the environment (Bonaparte et al., 2002; National Research Council, 2007; 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  One component is the cover system, 
placed over the waste and designed to prevent liquids from entering the disposal facility waste 
zone, the isolated area within the facility containing waste.  This is accomplished by resisting the 
downward flow of moisture or diverting it around the disposal facility (Scanlon et al., 2005).  
Another component is the liner system.  Situated below the waste zone, it acts to prevent waste 
mobilized in liquid from leaving the disposal facility.  Some designs can also remove liquids that 
collect within the bottom of the waste zone.  A third component is the waste form.  This 
represents the type of disposed waste, such as contaminated clothing, equipment, soils, and 
containers.  Depending on the type of waste, the waste form can be disposed of “as is” or be 
encased in a stabilizing bulk matrix (e.g., waste mixed with grout or vitrified waste).   A fourth 
component is the waste package, the overpack container holding the disposed waste.  There are a 
variety of waste packages: 55-gallon drums, steel canisters, wooden crates, B-25 boxes, and 
Sealand containers. 
The US Department of Energy (DOE) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are 
both in the process of reviewing their respective requirements and guidelines for disposal of 
LLW (Letourneau, 2010; Abdel-Khalik, 2011).  These reviews will take into account advances in 
understanding of LLW disposal, and issues that have arisen from implementation of the previous 
set of disposal requirements.  The DOE has also been interested in improving consistency in the 
PA process across the DOE complex, which could lead to an increase in confidence in the PA 
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and disposal facility performance (Letourneau et al., 2009).  One area that has been identified in 
past work relates to the question of when should a DOE disposal facility contain a liner system, 
and what type of liner should be used (Adams et al., 2009).   
This dissertation examines ways to improve the PA process.  Lessons learned will be analyzed 
from historical and current approaches in the DOE and NRC to confirm performance and build 
confidence in conceptual and mathematical models of disposal facilities.  Areas that show 
potential are the concept of modeling a near surface disposal facility (NSDF) as an integrated 
system of components, and the use of performance monitoring methodologies to better assess the 
current and future performance of a disposal facility.  Ultimately, the goal of this research is to 
develop a risk-informed decision-making tool to determine the effects of system components, 
how they influence each other, and on their combined contribution to LLW NSDF performance. 
1.2  Research Objectives 
The goal of this research is to demonstrate the development and applicability of an integrated 
“system of components” framework for analyzing the performance of a NSDF.  The specific 
objectives are: 
1) The establishment of a system of components framework for performance evaluation that 
identifies all components important to performance e.g., waste form, liner, cover, waste 
specific factors, and site-specific environmental factors.  
2) The evaluation of the waste zone for a NSDF, based on past and current practices at DOE 
disposal sites and the effects of corrosion on the buried waste packages over time. 
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3) Identification of the effects of changing waste zone parameters on the time to hydraulic 
failure of buried carbon steel waste packages. 
4) Modeling leachate buildup within waste packages and the subsequent release of leachate 
following hydraulic failure of the waste packages. 
5) Modeling of the effects of changing the installation date of an interim engineered cover over 
a filled section of a NSDF on leachate buildup and release to the environment. 
In Chapter 2, the regulation of LLW disposal for the US is discussed in detail.  The chapter 
begins with an extensive history of the DOE, the creation of the Environmental Management 
(EM) division, and current state of regulations for disposal of DOE LLW.  The NRC and its 
history are then discussed in the context of commercial LLW regulation and disposal.  The two 
different approaches, with their two sets of performance objects, are compared and contrasted.  
The LLW PA process is then discussed, followed by current efforts to improve consistency in the 
process through the use of performance confirmation. 
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of an integrated “system of components” framework to be used 
within the PA process.  This framework considers a NSDF as a system of three components: the 
engineered (cover and liner system) component, the waste component (composition, form, and 
package) and the site-specific environmental component (precipitation, geology, hydrology).  
The framework establishes that each of these components influences the overall performance of 
the NSDF, and therefore all three need to be considered when assessing both current and future 
NSDFs.  In order to establish the current state of the practice for DOE LLW disposal, five major 
DOE disposal sites were compared through investigation of their relevant component parameters. 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the waste component of a NSDF.  The effects on waste packages were 
evaluated based on changing parameters within the waste zone.  Current practice within a NSDF 
PA is to assume that all waste packages have fully degraded by the end of the 100-year post 
operational institutional control (IC) period.  Within the context of NSDF performance, this 
assumption means that the fully degraded waste packages would provide no barrier to waste 
movement within the waste zone.   The impacts of changing the degradation parameters and 
changing the waste package assumption were then assessed using two corrosion cases and four 
corrosion scenarios.  The two corrosion cases, a constant rate of corrosion, and a decreasing rate 
of corrosion, were chosen to reflect results from historical studies of metals buried in soils.  The 
four corrosion scenarios represented changes in the corrosivity and aeration parameters of the 
waste zone related to estimated future waste zone conditions.  These conditions were based on 
historical and current operating practices at the DOE Savannah River Site (SRS).  The results 
showed that under certain conditions waste packages remain hydraulically (can hold liquid) 
intact beyond the 100-year IC period, and some waste packages will be completely filled with 
liquid from precipitation infiltrating the waste zone through the NSDF engineered cover. 
In Chapter 5, the corrosion results from the previous chapter are taken and integrated with a 
NSDF cover system and environmental conditions modeled off of operating NSDFs at the SRS.  
Three infiltration situations were established based on past, current, and potential future cover 
installation practices at SRS.  This was done to show the timing effects of installing a cover 
system on the buildup of liquid within waste packages, and the liquid’s subsequent release from 
the waste packages when the packages hydraulically fail.  Results showed that liquid buildup 
within the waste zone can vary by over 200 percent from past practices to the proposed future 
practices. 
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Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings for using an integrated system of 
components framework and the applicability of this framework to future NSDF PAs.  The 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future work to further develop and expand the 




2.1  History of DOE LLW Regulations 
The fundamental problem of how to manage radioactive waste, a man-made and long-lived 
hazardous waste stream, has been a continuing challenge for the United States (US) government.  
The arm of the federal government in charge of the nation’s nuclear waste legacy is the 
Department of Energy (DOE). This agency draws its history from the original national defense 
activities of the Manhattan Project.  Following the end of World War II, nuclear activities were 
put under civilian control and rebranded as the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1946 (US 
Department of Energy, 1996a).  The new commission had the dual responsibility of continuing to 
develop the nation’s nuclear weapons arsenal and the peaceful implementation of science and 
technology related to atomic activities.  Along with these new goals was the responsibility to 
safely handle all nuclear waste generated by the government’s nuclear activities, both past and 
future, and manage the waste to adequately protect human health and the environment.   
The AEC’s authority to manage and dispose of radioactive waste was further expanded in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) Section 161(i).  This additional authority granted the agency 
the power to self-regulate all of its activities regarding nuclear and radioactive material to 
“protect human health and minimize danger to life or property” (("The Atomic Energy Act of 
1954," 1954; US Department of Energy, 1999b)).  This was a daunting task, as both substantial 
quantities and different types of waste were created in the development of nuclear weapons.  
Initial disposal options during the Manhattan project were limited due to the constraints of time 
and manpower imposed by the war effort.  As well, during this time period the health and 
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environmental hazards of radioactive waste, along with the ability of the waste to move through 
environmental media, were not well understood. This led scientists to dispose of large quantities 
of low level radioactive wastes (LLW) in a number of unsatisfactory ways, such as placing LLW 
mixed with liquids in outdoor lagoons to evaporate or burying the waste in unlined soil trenches 
(US EPA, 2013).   
In the case of liquid high level radioactive waste (HLW), derived from the reprocessing of spent 
nuclear fuel and contains a mixture of fission products, uranium, plutonium, and actinides, these 
wastes were stored in large underground metal tanks of up to one million gallons.  Complicating 
matters for HLW, most of these tanks were made of carbon steel, which corrode in the presence 
of a strong acid.  HLW coming from repossessing was dissolved in nitric acid, which required 
the waste to be neutralized with caustic substances (usually sodium hydroxide) before placement 
in the tanks.  This would later become important to the disposal of LLW because once the tanks 
are emptied of their liquid HLW fraction, some of the remaining insoluble material, along with 
the tanks themselves, are currently being considered as potential LLW streams. 
2.1.1  Creation of the DOE and Early Regulation 
During the early 1970s, the US Congress became concerned with the AEC’s dual mandate of 
promoting nuclear power and regulating safety within the industry.  To address this concern, the 
AEC was separated into two independent organizations under The Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974 (42 U.S.C.A. § 5801) (US NRC, 2007).  The Energy Research and Development 
Administration (ERDA) retained the AEC’s promotion of atomic energy for civilian and defense 
purposes, along with the AEA authority to self-regulate waste generated as a result of defense or 
government activities.  The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) received broad authority 
	 10	
to regulate the civilian nuclear program, including all radioactive wastes generated from civilian 
activities.  A few years later, as a result of the severe oil and energy crisis facing the country, 
President Carter signed into law The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, which 
created the present-day DOE (P.L. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565).  The ERDA, along with a number of 
other federal agencies and programs, were absorbed into this new agency.  With regards to LLW, 
similar to ERDA, the DOE retained all of the self-regulating authority granted under the AEA.   
Also during the 1970s, concerns over radioactive waste began to grow.  One of the first efforts to 
provide legislative remedies to this problem was the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control 
Act (UMTRCA) of 1978 and the resulting Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Actions (UMTRAs). 
This legislation was also one of the first crafted to address a specific radioactive waste stream 
(Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., 1999).  This goal of this act was to remediate the large uranium 
mill tailings sites left behind from the mining of uranium ore.  These sites contained both 
uranium and all of the associated uranium decay daughter products, such as radium and radon 
gas.  Remediation was accomplished by placing the tailings piles under engineered cover 
systems to prevent the infiltration of waste mobilizing precipitation while also providing a 
barrier against the escape of radon gas.   
With regards to government (defense) LLW, the next step came during the late 1970s and early 
1980s with the enactment of two major pieces of regulation. The first was the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976, which gave the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) the authority to regulate the generation and disposal of hazardous and radioactive 
wastes from currently operating facilities ("Resource Conservation and Recovery Act," 1976).  
The second was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) in 1980.  This act was also managed by the EPA and regulated the cleanup of legacy 
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facilities that were no longer in operation but contained sufficient amounts of legacy material 
hazardous to human health and the environment ("Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act," 1980).  However, when RCRA (and also the Clean Water Act 
of 1977[CWA]) were first promulgated the DOE refused to comply, arguing successfully that 
because DOE facilities were federal entities they were entitled to the “sovereign immunity” 
clause of RCRA, and therefore not subject to administrative and civil fines and penalties (Office 
of Health Safety and Security, 2011). 
With the Cold War winding down near the end of the 1980s, the DOE began to shift its resources 
from the research and production of nuclear weapons to dealing with the radioactive waste that 
had been produced over the previous four decades.  This led to the creation of the Office of 
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management in 1989, which was soon renamed the Office 
of Environmental Management (EM).  While the DOE had previously lost the ability to regulate 
commercially generated HLW and LLW with the Department of Energy Organization Act of 
1977, it still contained the power to self-regulate waste generated from national defense 
activities.  The management of this waste was covered under DOE Order 5820.2A, Radioactive 
Waste Management.  Issued on September 26th, 1988, the main purpose of this order was “to 
establish policies, guidelines, and minimum requirements by which the DOE manages its 
radioactive and mixed waste and contaminated facilities” (US Department of Energy, 1988). 
2.1.2  FFCA of 1992 and DNFSB Recommendation 94-2 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, radioactive waste management practices by the DOE 
were under increasing scrutiny, ultimately leading the state of Ohio to sue the DOE over the 
department’s stance on “sovereign immunity” with regards to the CWA and RCRA.  While the 
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US Supreme Count in DOE VS. OHIO 1992 eventually decided in favor of the DOE, members 
of Congress believed that the federal government needed to operate under the same rules and 
regulations as the private sector when it came to pollution (Office of Health Safety and Security, 
2011).  This lead to the promulgation of the Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992 (FFCA), 
which waived the right of sovereign immunity for all federal facilities under the regulation of 
RCRA ("The Federal Facilitiy Compliance Act of 1992," 1992).  The act also ordered the DOE 
to enter into negotiated agreements between waste generation sites and the respected states 
where they were located.  Cleanup milestones were established and civil fines and penalties 
could be levied against the DOE for violation of these agreements.   
Within this context, LLW management within the new Office of Environmental Management 
was challenging from the start.  Order 5820.2A was attacked both internally from DOE staff and 
externally from watchdog groups, who contended that the order was vague and did not provide 
sufficient guidance for adequate management and disposal of the DOE’s LLW.  One of the more 
influential critics was the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent 
review group established by Congress to provide recommendations on safety across the DOE 
complex.   
In particular the DNFSB had substantial issues with the LLW portion of Order 5820.2A, and in 
1994 wrote Recommendation 94-2 to the Secretary of Energy addressing the board’s concerns 
with DOE LLW management practices (DNFSB, 1994).  Titled “Conformance with Safety 
Standards at Department of Energy Low-Level Nuclear Waste and Disposal Sites”, the board 
identified a number of concerns and offered recommendations that it believed were critical to 
insuring safe disposal of LLW (taken from DOE G 435.1-1 Appendix A) (US Department of 
Energy, 1999a).  The first concern was that the DOE had not kept pace with the evolution of 
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commercial practices for waste disposal, with examples at DOE sites such as “minimal barriers 
to infiltration and biologic intrusion, no requirements to protect inadvertent human intruders, and 
operational practices not geared toward maintaining integrity of the waste form and the cover” 
(DNFSB, 1994; US Department of Energy, 1999a).  The second dealt with the requirement in 
DOE 5820.2A for the creation a PA at each site to show that the disposal facility will meet basic 
performance objectives similar to those outlined in NRC 10 CFR 61.  However, since the order 
was created there had not been a completion of any PA process.  The third issue was that 
requirements for a PA allowed the application of reference dose criteria to individual disposal 
facilities, ignored composite effect from interacting adjacent source terms, and excluded doses 
from legacy waste buried prior to the creation of the order in 1988.  A fourth concern was that 
some burial practices at the time were inadequate and would not meet performance objectives. 
Along with the likely prospect of one day having to remediate wastes disposed of prior to 1988, 
the DOE was severely underestimating projections of total LLW volumes.   
One main recommendation was that the DOE needed “additional requirements standards, or 
guidance on LLW Management”.  This was because there were a number of substantial issues 
not addressed in 5820.2A, such as how to handle established agreements with States/Tribes/EPA 
authorities for management and disposal of wastes at sites under provisions of either RCRA or 
CERCLA.  Finally, the other main recommendation was that the “DOE needed to improve its 
modeling and predictive capability for assessing radionuclide migration, enhancing stability of 
buried waste forms, deterring intrusion, and inhibiting migration of radionuclides” (US 
Department of Energy, 1999a).  
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2.1.3  1996 Complex-Wide Review and DOE Order 435.1 
In response to the recommendations of the DNFSB, EM began an extensive revision of Order 
5820.2A, and released draft version 5820.2B for DOE and DNFSB comment in May 1995 (US 
Department of Energy, 1999a).  While this version contained a detailed set of deposal 
requirements, the technical basis behind these requirements and their correlation to guidance 
within the Order was not clear.  Over 1,000 comments from internal DOE and DNFSB reviewers 
were written when the draft was released for review, with 41 serious safety concerns highlighted 
by the DNFSB.  In light of the inadequate nature of draft 5820.2B, EM decided to scrap the 
revision process and focus on creating a new order that addressed the many concerns raised by 
the review staff (US Department of Energy, 1999a; Letourneau et al., 2010).  
The first step was a comprehensive review of all LLW management activities within the DOE 
Complex to locate problems that could have an effect on public and worker safety (Letourneau et 
al., 2010).  Conducted across 36 sites, the 1996 Complex-Wide Review (1996 CWR) provided a 
baseline assessment of the DOE’s LLW disposal activities.  The CWR identified 6 major 
weaknesses with the DOE’s current practices, along with a number of site-specific issues.  These 
6 areas of concern mirrored the recommendations within DNFSB 94-2: there was insufficient 
forecasting and capacity planning of LLW disposal, ineffective characterization of LLW, 
continued storage of LLW with a disposal path along with a lack of proper storage conditions for 
all LLW, there existed quantities of orphaned LLW (no path to disposal), and finally that the PA 
process does not contain stringent requirements on content and has yet to produce an approved 
document (US Department of Energy, 1996b). 
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Using the findings from the CWR and Defense Board recommendations, a new order was 
completed in the form of DOE Order 435.1, which was issued and implemented in 1999 (with an 
accompanying Manual (M) 435.1 and Implementation Guide (G) 435.1).  Included in this new 
Order were requirements for the management and disposal of HLW, transuranic waste (TRU), 
LLW, and the radioactive component of mixed waste (DOE G 435.1 Appendix A).  In creating 
Order 435.1, DOE staff used a process known as the Integrated Safety Management System 
(ISMS), since it “provided a formal, organized process for planning, performing, assessing, and 
improving” the DOE’s approach to LLW management (Letourneau et al., 2010).  There were a 
number of objectives driving the creation of the final Order (taken from DOE G 435.1-1 
Appendix A):  
• Incorporation of the recommendations made by the DNFSB (in 94-2 and on 5820.2B) and 
comments made in response by internal DOE staff; 
• Development of a defendable technical basis for requirements and guidance within the Order;   
• Development of requirements that are risk-informed and performance-based, as opposed to 
prescriptive requirements (such as those used under RCRA); 
• Adequately address the concerns of stakeholders; 
• Other emerging considerations, including a shift closer to external regulation, the adoption of 
industry consensus standards, and DOE’s efforts to delegate more operation authority to field 
managers. 
In operation for over 15 years, Order 435.1 continues to be the main directive governing DOE 
LLW disposal, and has provided the framework for a number of successful PA, such as the E-
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Area LLW disposal facilities at the Savannah River Site (SRS) and the RWMC at Idaho National 
Labs (INL) (DOE Idaho, 2007; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  EM 
has recently finished an updated Complex-Wide Review, and is now in the process of revising 
and updating Order 435.1 (though unlike 5820.2A, this is not planned to be a completely new 
Order) (Letourneau et al., 2010).  EM staff is hoping to address the concept of performance 
monitoring within the new Order and accompanying guidance.  As well, there have been 
discussions to combine the current Order 435.1 performance objectives and PA process with 
international standards and methods developed through the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). 
2.2  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approach to LLW Disposal 
In the first few decades after the Manhattan Project, the AEC was responsible for both promoting 
and regulating the civilian nuclear industry (US Department of Energy, 1997a; US NRC, 2007).  
Congress acted to change this conflicting dual mandate with The Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974, removing the regulating aspect from the AEC’s mission and giving this responsibility to 
the newly created NRC [42 U.S.C.A. § 5801; Public Law 93-438].  As mentioned in section 
2.1.1, the NRC received all of the licensing and rule-making authority contained within the AEA 
of 1954 with regards to the civilian nuclear program (US NRC, 2007). 
Beginning with the AEC, LLW was regulated using a group of basic and generic regulations.  
These regulations were included in sections of 10 CFR 20, “Standards for Protection Against 
Radiation;” 10 CFR 30, “Rules of General Applicability to Domestic Licensing of Byproduct 
Material;” 10 CFR 40, “Domestic Licensing of Source Material;” and 10 CFR 70, “Domestic 
Licensing of Special Nuclear Material” (US NRC, 2000; US NRC, 2007).  The NRC upon its 
	 17	
creation continued to use these regulations as the basis for their operations.   They also began a 
formal rulemaking process to address a number of growing needs and concerns from public and 
industry stakeholders, along with Congress and local state governments.  These concerns 
developed in part from the failures of early LLW disposal at sites such as Maxey Flats, which 
were found to have been leaking liquid containing radionuclides into the surrounding 
environment.  Also during this time, there did not exist a defined set of standards (either 
domestically or abroad) that could be referenced to properly assess whether a LLW disposal 
facility would provide sufficient protection to the public from disposed waste (US NRC, 2007).   
The goals for the new set of regulations were to create a “set of comprehensive standards, 
technical criteria, and licensing procedures” for the licensing of new commercial LLW disposal 
sites along with operational and closure requirements for existing sites.  A formal National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) scoping process was initiated in 1978, and four years later the 
final set of regulations were promulgation in December 1982 as 10 CFR 61, “Licensing 
Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste” [(US NRC, 2007);47 FR 57446)]. 
The new set of regulations was designed to be applicable to all near surface disposal facilities 
(NSDF) containing commercial LLW.  A detailed discussion of 10 CFR 61 is contained within 
NUREG 1853, “History and Framework of Commercial Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Management in the United States” (US NRC, 2007).  Requirements were included on all aspects 
of LLW disposal, incorporating sections on site selection, facility design, waste form, licensing, 
site closure, and minimum performance standards during operation and post-closure.  
Requirements for licensing stressed an integrated systems approach to ensure the facility 
achieved the relevant performance objectives over its design life.  Strong consideration 
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given to passive engineered waste containment systems (barriers) to adequately protect against 
release after the institutional control (IC) period of radionuclides with long half-lives.   
The idea of the human intruder scenario and protecting the “Inadvertent Intruder” was also 
introduced for the first time within 10 CFR 61.   The concept assumed that disposed waste would 
be hazardous long after ICs had ended, and that precautions should be taken to provide 
protection to a future member of the public who might inadvertently come in contact with 
disposed waste.  Flexibility in site design and operation was given to ensure that a NSDF would 
meet all performance objectives over a wide range of site characteristics (i.e. precipitation, 
geology/hydrogeology) and waste streams (46 FR 38083).  This was done to account for the 
varying mobility of radionuclides and thus their availability for groundwater/surface water 
exposure pathways within different environments.  Radionuclide mobility can be influenced by 
the amount of moisture that comes in contact with disposed waste, along with the underlying 
geomorphology and hydrology of a site.   
Site design flexibility was achieved with the creation of a waste classification system, which 
took into consideration the relative concentrations of short-lived and long-lived radionuclides.  
Waste can be designated as class A/B/C based on a series of criteria laid out in 10 CFR 61.55 
(see figure 2.1 for a detailed explanation of the classification system).  Class A waste is the least 
hazardous and requires the least stringent disposal requirements.  Class B waste disposal must 
meet certain enhanced waste form requirements to guarantee disposal stability.  Class C waste 
must be disposed in a facility that provides additional protection for inadvertent intruders up to 




Figure 2.1: Chart reproduced from NUREG-1853 p.4 (US NRC, 2007); information taken from NUREG/BR-0121 
(US NRC, 1989). 
In order to aid both LLW license applicants and NRC review teams with the implementation of 
10 CFR 61, a number of guidance documents (four in particular were significant contributors of 
guidance) were subsequently developed by NRC staff.  The first of these written after the 
promulgation of 10 CFR 61 was NUREG-1300, “Environmental Standard Review Plan for the 
Review of a License Application for a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility” ((US 
NRC, 1987)).  This document provided general guidance on license review to applicants and 
NRC review staff, including relevant information that needed to be incorporated into a LLW 
disposal application Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  As part of the Low Level Waste 
Policy Act, each 10 CFR 61 application required the creation of an EIS (US NRC, 2000; US 
NRC, 2007).   
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The next document, issued in 1991, was NUREG-1199, “Standard Format and Content of a 
License Application for a Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility”, and details the 
requirements set forth in 10 CFR 61 for the Licensee in drafting a license application ((US NRC, 
1991)).  Following this in 1994 was NUREG-1200, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a 
License Application for a Low-Level Radioactive Disposal Facility”.  This document contains 
guidance for the NRC review team assigned to a given 10 CFR 61 license application (US NRC, 
1994).   
The last of the major documents was written in response to the fact that the three previous 
guidance documents contained general information on license applications but did not contain 
sufficient guidance relating disposal facility performance to the performance objective in 10 CFR 
61.41 (protection of members of the public) (US NRC, 2000).  With this in mind, the NRC 
Performance Assessment Working Group wrote NUREG-1573 (2000), “A Performance 
Assessment Methodology for Low-Level Radioactive Disposal Facilities” (US NRC, 2000; US 
NRC, 2007). The document provides in-depth guidance on the creation of a PA for any LLW 
NSDF application.  In addition, a number of regulatory issues that had developed since the 
promulgation of 10 CFR 61 relating to technical requirements contained within the regulation.  
The authors of NUREG-1573 also addressed these issues, along with providing advice on 
modeling approaches used within a PA. 
Recently the NRC has been in discussions on ways to update 10 CFR 61 and try to bring some of 
the PA guidance contained within NUREG-1573 into a formal rulemaking process (Abdel-
Khalik, 2011).  While no decisions have been made, two issues have been raised from the 
discussions.  The first is what to do about Depleted Uranium (DU), how should it be 
characterized and how should it be disposed of.  The second is an increase in the period of 
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compliance, currently at 10,000 years for the NRC, to 20,000 years to capture the ingrowth of 
uranium daughter products in DU. 
2.3  Comparison of DOE and NRC Approaches to Regulating LLW Disposal Facilities 
The basics of regulating LLW disposal are similar between the DOE and the NRC.  Many of the 
concepts and requirements for LLW disposal contained within DOE’s regulations were 
incorporated from parts of 10 CFR 61 ((US Department of Energy, 1999a),(Wilhite, 2001). 
There are however a number of substantive differences that exist between the two organizations.  
In comparing the two sets of regulations there are two main areas to consider: performance 
objectives and PA methodology.  This section will discuss each area of regulation from the NRC 
perspective and then compare that with the relevant requirements contained within DOE Order 
435.1. 
2.3.1  NSDF Performance Objectives 
The performance objectives laid out by the DOE and NRC for LLW disposal facilities are 
similar between the two agencies, with the DOE including several additional objectives (see 
Table 2.1).  The NRC has five performance objectives contained within 10 CFR 61 (parts 40 
through 44), with part 40 outlining general requirements and parts 41-44 discussing specific 
objectives (US NRC, 1982b).  The DOE has a number of corresponding and additional 
performance objectives within DOE M 435.1, and are contained within Parts IV.P and IV.Q (US 
Department of Energy, 1999c).   
General Requirements (Part 40; NRC) states that “Land disposal facilities must be sited, 
designed, operated, closed, and controlled after closure so that reasonable assurance exists that 
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exposures to humans are within the limits established in the performance objectives in §§ 61.41 
through 61.44” (US NRC, 1982b).  The DOE version contained in 435.1 M IV.P (1) is very 
similar to this, while also including the requirement of disposal site maintenance during the IC 
period, though this requirement is implied within 10 CFR 61 and NUREG-1573 (Wilhite, 2001).   
Next in 10 CFR 61 Part 41, “Protection of the General Population from Releases of 
Radioactivity”, the regulation states that any release of radionuclides from the disposal facility 
through all pathways (along with environmental media) must not, for a member of the public, 
exceed a 25 mrem/yr dose to the whole body, a 75 mrem/yr dose to the thyroid, and a 25 
mrem/yr dose to any other organ.  Protection for a member of the public under Order 435.1 [M 
435.1 IV.P (1)(a)] for all pathways (excluding radon) is exactly the same as Part 41, though the 
terminology was changed to 25 mrem/yr of Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE).  This 
change was done to reflect an update to the original International Commission on Radiological 
Protection (ICRP)-2 standards used in 10 CFR 61 for establishing dose methodology.   Order 
435.1 incorporated the updated ICRP-30 standards (ICRP, 1959; ICRP, 1979).   
The DOE then includes three additional requirements in Order 435.1, two based on the air 
pathway and one for the protection of groundwater.  The first air requirement states that a dose 
via the air pathway (excluding radon) to a member of the public shall not exceed 10 mrem/yr 
TEDE.  The second requirement is a limit of 20 pCi/m2/s average flux for radon at the surface of 
the disposal facility (or 0.5 pCi/L radon flux at the site boundary).  The groundwater requirement 
is based on the need to ensure that groundwater meets EPA drinking water standards at the point 
of compliance, located 100 meters (m) downgradient from the edge of a disposal facility.  The 
limit contained in the standards is 4 mrem/yr from man-made beta and gamma emitting 
radionuclides [M 435.1 IV.P (2)(g)] (U.S.C., 1977; Wilhite, 2001).   
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Following the performance objective in Part 41 is Part 42, “Protection of Individuals from 
Inadvertent Intrusion,” which states that “Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal 
facility must ensure protection of any individual inadvertently intruding into the disposal site” 
once the IC period is over (US NRC, 1982b).  The dose limit for an individual is based on the 
NRC waste classification system and is set at 500 mrem/yr (US NRC, 1982a).  The DOE 
performance objective takes this one step further, requiring a disposal facility to meet a chronic 
inadvertent intruder exposure scenario of 100 mrem/yr in addition to an acute exposure scenario 
of 500 mrem/yr (assuming 100 years of IC following site closure) [DOE M 435.1 IV.P (2)(h)] 
(Wilhite, 2001). 
The next performance objective is contained in Part 43, “Protection of Individuals During 
Operations,” which states that radiation protection for all workers and the public during the 
operation phase of a disposal facility must follow the standards contained in 10 CFR 20, 
“Standards for Protection Against Radiation” (US NRC, 1982b).  The DOE has two sets of 
regulatory documents that it follows for protection during the operational phase.  The first is 
radiological protection for workers (10 CFR 835, “Occupational Radiation Protection”), while 
the second is for members of the public and the environment (DOE Order 458.1, “Radiation 
Protection of the Public and the Environment”).  According to a 2001 conference paper by 
Wilhite, radiological protections for both workers and the public can be assumed to be similar 
during the operational phase of a disposal facility (Wilhite, 2001). 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Relevant DOE and NRC LLW Performance Objectives 
NRC  DOE 
Location Description Specific Requirement  Location Description Specific Requirement 
10 CRF 61.41 
Protection of the 
general population 
from releases of 
radioactivity (annual 
dose limits to a 
member of the public 
from all pathways) 
-25 mrem to the 
whole body 
 
-75 mrem to the 
thyroid 
 
-25 mrem to any 
other organ 
 
-M 435.1 IV .P 
(1)(a) 
 
-M 435.1 IV .P 
(2)(g) 
Annual dose limits in TEDE 
to a representative member 
of the public 
-25 mrem from all pathways 
(excluding radon) 
 
-10 mrem via air pathways 
(excluding radon) 
 
-20 pCi/m2/s average flux limit 
for radon at the surface of the 
disposal facility (or 0.5 pCi/L 
at site boundary) 
No NRC equivalent  
-M 435.1 IV.P 
(2)(b) 
 
-M 435.1 IV.P 
(2)(g) 
 
-41 CFR 141 
Annual dose limits in 
groundwater at compliance 
point (100 meters from site 
boundary) to a 
representative member of 
the public 
-4 mrem/yr of beta and gamma 
emitting radionuclides 




-Dose limit of 500 
mrem/year  
-M 435.1 IV .P 
(2)(h) 
Protection of a hypothetical 
person assumed to 
inadvertently intrude for a 
temporary period after 
failure of ICs (at 100 years 
post-closure) 
-100 mrem/yr TEDE chronic 
exposure scenario 
 
-500 mrem/yr TEDE acute 
exposure scenario 





consistent with 10 
CFR 20 
 -10 CFR 835 Occupational Radiation Protection -Compatible with 10 CFR 20 
 -DOE O 458.1 Radiation Protection of the 
Public and the Environment -Compatible with 10 CRF 20 
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NRC  DOE 
Location Description Specific Requirement  Location Description Specific Requirement 
10 CFR 61.44 
Stability of the 
disposal site after 
closure (taken from 
NUREG-1199) 
-“Site Stability is 
focused on reducing 
the contact of water 
with the waste 
and…will not be a 
need for active 
maintenance 
following closure” 
 -M 435.1 IV.P (6)(a) 
-Stability requirements for 
site operators 
-Ensures that the design and 
operation of the disposal cell is 
consistent with procedures and 
predictions described in the site 
closure plan 
   -M 435.1 IV .Q (1)(b) -Long-term site stability 
-Detail in closure plan how 
closure will minimize the need 
for active maintenance 
following closure 
   
-M 435.1 IV.P 
(2)(c) 
-PA must include projection 
of long-term site stability 
-“PAs shall address reasonably 
foreseeable natural processes 
that might disrupt barriers 





The last performance objective laid out in 10 CFR 61 is Part 44, “Stability of the Disposal Site 
After Closure”.  A disposal facility is required to have long-term stability throughout its lifespan 
(operational and post-closure) and to minimize the need for active maintenance once the site is 
closed (though monitoring is acceptable).  For DOE facilities, demonstration of long-term 
stability is contained within the requirements for the preliminary and final site closure plan, 
along with the need to minimize active maintenance post-closure.  These requirements are 
located in DOE M 435.1 IV.Q (1)(b) (Wilhite, 2001).  Similar to the previous performance 
objective, 10 CFR 61.44 and the related DOE regulation are shown to be equivalent. 
2.3.2  Performance Assessment Methodology 
The process of evaluating a potential LLW disposal site using a radiological PA is similar for 
both the DOE and NRC.  Both organizations use an iterative process of site characterization, 
development of conceptual models followed by mathematical models, analysis using those 
models, evaluations of parameter sensitivity/uncertainty, and finally an interpretation of the 
results compared against regulatory performance objectives (Shott et al., 1998; US NRC, 2000).  
Both require the inclusion of an inadvertent intruder performance scenario (the NRC pioneered 
this type of performance scenario in the Draft EIS for 10 CFR 61 (US Nuclear Regulatory 
Comission, 1981; US NRC, 2007)), which simulates a future member of the public inadvertently 
drilling or disturbing the disposal facility following the end of ICs.  They also require that As 
Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) practices are followed for releases of radionuclides to 
the environment.   
One of the important differences between the two government agencies is the period of 
compliance: for the DOE it is 1,000 years, while the NRC requires a demonstration of 
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compliance for 10,000 years (20,000 if proposed revisions to 10 CFR 61 proceed).  However, the 
NRC contains a less structured process for issuing and maintaining a disposal license compared 
to the DOE and their requirement for a “Disposal Authorization Statement” (DAS).  In addition 
to the PA, the DOE requires that a Composite Analysis (CA) (used to demonstrate that all the 
combined dose from all buried material across an entire site meet the performance objectives), 
Long Term Maintenance and Surveillance Plan (monitoring plan during the operational phase), 
and Closure Plan are all created before the DAS is issued.  DOE manual 435.1 and the 
accompanying guidance contain specific instructions on the creation of each document.  
Maintenance and updates for each document are required throughout the lifespan of the facility. 
Review and approval of all document versions is conducted by the Low Level Waste Disposal 
Facility Federal Review Group (LFRG), which contains a mix of DOE headquarters and field 
staff.   
The NRC by contrast contains recommendations within NUREG-1573 for the licensee to 
monitor the disposal facility and update the Closure Plan if necessary, but leaves wide discretion 
to the licensee.  The DOE goes even further in M 435.1 to require annual assessments of the 
validity of the conclusions within the PA, with action triggers to force a revision of the PA 
should assumptions or results change (this is referred to in DOE M 435.1 IV.(P)4 as PA 
Maintenance). 
2.4  Current Efforts to Improving PA Confidence
2.4.1  Performance Evaluation Process 
The creation of a PA is not a one-time event, and is not conducted in isolation.  Instead, the 
document can be thought of as growing and evolving over the operational and post-closure life 
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of the facility.  The overall process of creating an initial PA and updating it over time is an 
implementation of the Performance Evaluation Process, and can be broken down into three 
sections: performance objectives, an initial PA, and performance confirmation.   
 
Figure 2.2: Schematic of the Performance Evaluation Process showing the three sections of the process, with 
feedback loop from performance confirmation to the PA.  Taken from a lecture given by Dr. James Clarke, 
Vanderbilt University (2011). 
The first component of the process is the performance objectives, which as discussed in the 
previous section are a set of objective that any current and future LLW disposal facility must 
meet in order to ensure the adequate protection of human health and the environment.  These 
objectives are then used as the basis for the design and analysis of the disposal facility 
performance, which is contained within the PA.  For a LLW disposal facility being evaluated, the 
initial PA is conducted before the construction of the facility.  Existing site and waste 
characterization is combined with estimates and best-guess expert opinions to produce a 
preliminary evaluation of long-term facility performance for a determined disposal inventory and 
design.  Once operation at the disposal facility has begun however, there needs to be a way to 
incorporate new knowledge and changes in the assumptions used to produce the original analysis 










This leads into the third component of the performance evaluation process, performance 
confirmation.  Since the lifespan of an operational disposal facility is decades and the post-
closure compliance period for the DOE lasts 1,000 years, the performance confirmation step 
represents a feedback loop to the PA.  This helps to confirm the assumptions made in analyzing 
performance or to update those assumptions as need.  Changes in the assumptions can result 
from changes in inventory, improved knowledge and understanding of waste disposal, changes in 
site characteristics, or the identification of areas that require further investigation.   
The performance confirmation step allows for the PA to be revised to include all new data into 
the performance analysis of the disposal facility, provide an updated assurance that the 
performance objectives will continue to be met, or recommend actions to ensure compliance.  
The following sections discuss how the DOE and NRC each implement an equivalent of the 
Performance Evaluation Process. 
2.4.2  Performance Assessment Maintenance 
Under DOE Order 435.1, demonstration that the performance objectives laid out in DOE M 
435.1 chapter IV.(P) will be met is accomplished through the analysis conducted within the PA.   
The role of performance confirmation within 435.1 is carried out through the requirements in M 
IV (P) 4 and is referred to as “Performance Assessment Maintenance” (Letourneau, 2010).   The 
NRC does not have specific performance confirmation requirements, but rather general 
requirements for a generic PA within NUREG-1573.  Guidance within M IV (P) 4 requires that 
PA maintenance be conducted to “evaluate changes that could affect the performance, design, 
and operating basis for the [disposal] facility… and shall include the conduct of research, field 
studies, and [environmental] monitoring needed to address uncertainties or gaps in existing data” 
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(US Department of Energy, 1999c).  Some specific examples of PA maintenance include the 
development of novel environmental monitoring techniques (e.g., using aerial satellite imagery 
to assess the health of a vegetative cover) (Gladden, 2010), field experiments using test beds to 
better understand the movement of moisture through an engineered cover (Parsons et al., 2010), 
and field testing of long-term effects on waste packages and barrier components to 
environmental exposure (Jones et al., 2003).  
The DOE sets out three requirements for PA maintenance within chapter IV (4).  The first is that 
a PA must be “reviewed and revised when changes in waste forms or containers, radionuclide 
inventories, facility design and operations, closure concepts, or the improved understanding of 
the performance of the waste disposal facility in combination with the features of the site…alter 
the conclusions or the conceptual model of the existing performance assessment” (IV P [4a]).  
The second is that the PA is to be evaluated on a yearly basis to ensure that it continues to 
provides an adequate representation of disposal facility performance while incorporating any 
new information gathered throughout the past year (IV P [4b]).  The third is the preparation of an 
annual summary to provide information concerning the performance of the facility over the 
period addressed (US Department of Energy, 1999a; National Security Technologies LLC, 2009; 
Parsons et al., 2010; Swingle et al., 2010).  Along with reporting the inventory of waste disposed 
to date, environmental monitoring results, and results from any current field studies, the 
summary discusses whether there is any need to revise or update the PA.  Similar to other 
documents required by 435.1, the annual summaries are written by site technical staff, then 
reviewed and approved by the LFRG.  
One instance of the implementation of PA maintenance is the Z-Area (Saltstone) disposal 
facility.  The initial PA was conducted in 1992 and provided assurances of performance for the 
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disposal of a low-level radioactive aqueous waste stream containing high levels of sodium salts 
mixed with grout and placed in up to 15 vaults, with adequate protection of groundwater and 
future inadvertent intruders (Martin Marietta Energy Systems Inc., 1992).  With the advent of 
Order 435.1, the assumptions built into the original PA were reevaluated in a Special Analysis 
(SA) conducted in 2002.  The new requirements of Order 435.1 were taken into account, along 
with proposed changes in inventory, and changes to the final disposal facility design.  The results 
were to be incorporated into a revision of the existing PA (Cook et al., 2002).   
The following year, another study revised the disposal limits of C-14, when it was discovered 
that C-14 concentrations in Savannah River Tank 41 were higher than estimated and would have 
exceeded the limit calculated in the 2002 SA (Cook and Kaplan, 2003).  Another SA was 
conducted on Vault Four in 2005, this time to again update the disposal limits based on revisions 
to the analytical models used to evaluate performance.  However, this SA concluded that the 
conceptual site model of Saltstone nor the conclusions of the PA had been altered, and therefore 
there was no need to update the PA, superseding the conclusions of the 2002 and 2003 SAs 
(Cook et al., 2005).  Finally, the annual summary for FY 2009 indicated that while disposal 
vaults one and four were operating under the conceptual models set forth in the 1992 PA and the 
2005 SA, a revision of the PA was warranted since future disposal vaults were going to be of a 
substantially different design than the current vaults (Savannah River Remediation LLC, 2010).  




COMPARISON OF LLW DISPOSAL FACILITIES AT MAJOR DEPARTMENT OF 
ENERGY SITES 
3.1  Introduction 
The United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE) has disposed of millions of cubic meters 
(m) of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) over the past 70 years.  Much of this waste has been 
placed in near surface disposal facilities (NSDFs), in accordance with DOE’s self-regulating 
authority, as specified in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Letourneau et al., 2010).  Beginning in 
1988, with the promulgation of DOE Order 5280.2A, each facility that accepted waste after this 
date was required to demonstrate that radiological performance objectives would be achieved 
over the lifespan of the facility (US Department of Energy, 1988; US Department of Energy, 
1999b; Letourneau et al., 2010).  In 1999, this order was replaced with DOE Order 435.1, which 
emphasized risk-based and performance-based requirements for LLW disposal (US Department 
of Energy, 1999a).   
These requirements include a set of objectives that are designed to restrict concentrations of 
radioactive materials at a location 100 m downgradient from a disposal facility to a level that is 
environmentally acceptable.  Meeting these performance objectives dictates the type and amount 
of waste that can be placed within a disposal facility, based on future potential waste releases 
from that facility and projected doses to representative members of the public (US Department of 
Energy, 1999c).  A required performance assessment (PA) is conducted to demonstrate 
compliance with the performance objectives for a period of 1,000 years following facility 
closure.  Typically, the disposal site location and waste characteristics are determined prior to 
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designing the engineered portion of the NSDF, and the PA is used to establish the disposal 
facility waste limits that allow the performance objectives to be met. 
This article looks at the concept of a NSDF as a unified system of three components or 
subsystems.  The three subsystems are facility engineering design, waste form/package 
considerations, and site-specific environmental characteristics.  This approach incorporates an 
analysis of how the subsystems interact and work together within the NSDF system.  Since 
NSDFs all contain these three components, they could be used to provide a basis for an improved 
approach to facility PA.  A system of components framework could be incorporated as part of a 
future approach to implementing a more standardized PA methodology. 
Information was collected for five major LLW disposal facilities from across the DOE complex.  
This information was used to establish a basis for the current approach to near surface LLW 
disposal at US federal sites.   
3.1.1  Building Confidence in Performance Assessments 
Every NSDF operated by the DOE is unique.  Waste streams derive from local operations, each 
site has a distinct climate and geology, and engineered features reflect a mixture of site design 
preference and regulations.  Additional differences arise from the methodology and conceptual 
models used to conduct the performance analysis within a PA.  There are multiple contractors, 
site technical staff, and regulating offices involved in the PA process, many with their own 
preferred set of analysis tools (Letourneau et al., 2009).  All of this can complicate comparisons 
of NSDFs and their subsequent PA results.   
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Along with demonstrating regulatory compliance, providing stakeholder confidence in the 
analysis and performance of a NSDF is a major goal of all PAs.  Historically, methodology and 
performance results can and have been impacted by a number of factors, including uncertainties 
present in many assessment input parameters, variability of long-term natural processes, and the 
durability of engineered components (Letourneau et al., 2009).  Long-term performance data on 
the order of 100s of years is not yet available for NSDFs, and there are no complete long-term 
natural analogs of NSDFs, so that assumptions with uncertainties must be incorporated into a PA 
(Rustick et al., 2013).   
DOE technical staff have recognized that inconsistencies in PA approaches, such as differences 
in conceptual models or parameterization, can negatively affect transparency and confidence in 
the validity of the PA process, and have begun to address this issue (Letourneau et al., 2009).  
For example, revisions to DOE Order 435.1 are being proposed, and the Risk and Performance 
Community of Practice has provided a vehicle for increased technical exchanges among 
stakeholders.  Keeping a balance between a more consistent approach to PA methodology, while 
allowing for genuine differences between sites, is key to avoiding unproductive uniformity.  
Such a balance also provides a defensible environment for comparison of NSDF design and 
performance to regulators and stakeholders.  The approach discussed in this article is based on a 
system of components approach that can help to achieve this balance of flexibility and 
consistency across NSDFs. 
The last major comparison of DOE NSDF performance was completed in 1995, to assess the 
ability of fifteen different DOE sites to safely dispose of a screened list of radionuclides, using 
either a below ground trench or an above ground tumulus NSDF (Sandia National Laboratories, 
1996; Waters and Gruebel, 1996; Waters et al., 1996).  Concentrations of radionuclides, at the 
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standard 100 m compliance point from the facility boundary, were examined for subsurface 
leachate and airborne transport from the facility (source terms).  A grouted waste form was used 
to estimate leaching of radionuclides over time.   
This article builds on that study by reporting on the current state of the practice in DOE LLW 
disposal for five major DOE sites, and provides comparisons of all parameters that would be 
used for the groundwater transport pathway.  To limit the scope for this article, an assumption 
was made that all radionuclides for a hypothetical site are eventually released to the 
groundwater, and airborne transport was not investigated at this time. 
3.2 An Integrated System Approach 
Each DOE facility chosen represents a different set of disposal conditions, is active or in the 
planning stage, and has a PA that was generated in accordance with DOE Order 435.1.  The five 
selected facilities are:  
• the Savannah River E-Area Engineered Trenches (ETs), 
• the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF), 
• the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radioactive Waste Management Complex 
(RWMC), 
• the Oak Ridge Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF), and 
• the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Area 5 Disposal Facility.   
An effort was made to provide consistent data sets for each facility.  Particular care was used to 
ensure that climate data was readily comparable.  Unlike descriptions of waste composition and 
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engineered systems that generally used similar metrics across the DOE complex, there was wide 
variation in the amount and detail for climate data available directly within the PA.  To address 
this concern, station data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
was used to provide supplemental climate data to allow direct comparisons across the sites. 
3.2.1  The System Components or Subsystems 
We modeled a NSDF as an “integrated system” consisting of three components or sub-systems, 
viz, the engineered facility design, the waste /waste form, and the site-specific environment. 
The engineered disposal facility sub-system is comprised of any installed cover and/or liner 
systems, along with the volume and footprint of the waste zone.  Cover systems are used as 
primary infiltration barriers, incorporating a resistive or evapotranspirative (water balance) 
approach, and are installed in stages.  In many cases, differing components are used before, 
during, and after the institutional control (IC) period.  Typical materials include compacted clay, 
sand, geomembranes, and geotextiles.  Liner systems are used to prevent leachate from leaving 
the waste zone, and can only be installed before a facility begins accepting waste.  Construction 
materials are similar to those used in cover systems.  The footprint area of the disposal facility 
dictates the potential flux of leachate from the waste zone, and the facility volume affects 
subsidence potential.  
The waste /waste form sub-system is a combination of waste composition, waste form, and waste 
package.  Waste composition defines the specific radionuclide types and amounts within each 
unit of waste.  Waste form comes in many types, ranging from contaminated clothing and filters 
to machine components and demolition debris.  Waste can also be stabilized in a bulk matrix of 
another material, e.g., a cementitious material, to reduce leaching potential.  Waste packages are 
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structures that isolate waste within a defined container, and are used in waste transport, disposal, 
or both.  They can range from cardboard and wooden crates to steel containers and grouted 
vaults.  Not all waste is contained within a package; some is unstabilized (disposed “as is”).  
Depending on the robustness of the waste package, there can be varying effects on waste zone 
infiltration, subsidence potential, and radionuclide movement in the waste zone. 
The environmental sub-system includes climate and subsurface features.  Rain and snowfall 
events affect infiltration and evapotranspiration on annual and seasonal timescales, and can be 
related to transport of moisture through the engineered barriers.  Precipitation, temperature, and 
humidity are factors in engineered barrier and waste package degradation over time.  Site 
geology and hydrology control transport of leachate from the disposal facility through the vadose 
and saturated zones to a point 100 m downgradient within the saturated zone.  Chemical 
distribution coefficients are used to approximate the various sorption processes within site 
geology to calculate the additional time required for any given radionuclide to reach the 100 m 
compliance point, compared to natural subsurface recharge and groundwater flow. 
3.3 Site Comparison Data 
Six comparison categories were developed for the three sub-systems that control NSDF 
performance: Climate, Hydrogeology, Geochemistry; Facility Dimensions and Cover, Facility 
Liner; and Waste.   
Information for each category is presented in Tables 3.1 through 3.6, followed by a brief 
introduction of the five sites and additional detail on the hydrogeology, engineered components, 
and waste parameters for each facility. 
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Table 3.1:  Environmental Parameters - Climate Data 
 SRS E-Area Oak Ridge Idaho RMWC Hanford IDF NNSS Area 5 
Avg. Rainfall 1224 mm/yr 1370 mm/yr 214 mm/yr 173 mm/yr 124 mm/yr 
Max. Annual 
Rainfall 1964 1866 mm 1973 1939 mm 1966 144 mm 1995 313 mm 1998 246 mm 
Min. Annual 
Rainfall 1954 732 mm 2007 910 mm 1963 366 mm 1976 76 mm 1989 29.0 mm 
Estimated 
Infiltration 400 mm/yr 570 mm/yr 10 mm/yr 4.2 mm/yr 0 mm/yr 
Freq. of storm 
event per 24 hrs. 
≥2.5 mm 68/yr ≥2.5 mm 88/yr ≥2.5 mm 26/yr ≥2.5 mm 23/yr ≥2.5 mm 15/yr 
≥13 mm  27/yr ≥13 mm  37/yr ≥13 mm  3/yr ≥13 mm  1/yr ≥13 mm  3/yr 
≥25 mm 12/yr ≥25 mm 14/yr ≥25 mm 0.2/yr ≥25 mm 0.1/yr ≥25 mm 0.8/yr 
Largest 24 hr. 
precip. event 9/3/98 188 mm 8/10/60 189 mm 6/6/95 40 mm 10/2/57 48.5 mm 8/18/83 89 mm 
Monthly Avg. 
Rainfall - Low Nov. 66 mm Oct. 76 mm Jul. 12 mm Jul. 5 mm Jun. 4 mm 
Monthly Avg. 
Rainfall - High Jul. 131 mm Jul. 134 mm May 30.5 mm Dec. 26 mm Feb. 17 mm 
Avg. Snowfall 30.5 mm (Augusta, GA) 260 mm 676 mm 373 mm 





1973 356 mm 
Feb. 
1996 305 mm 
Dec. 
1971 566 mm 
Jan. 
1950 594 mm Feb. 1987 152 mm 
Avg. Annual 
Temp. 17.8 °C 14.4 °C  5.7 °C 11.9 °C 15.2 °C 
Max. Daily 
Temp. Jul. 41.6° C Jul. 40.6 °C Jul. 41 °C Aug. 45 °C Jul. 46 °C 




Winter Temp. 1.7 °C– 12.8 °C  2.8 °C - 9.7 °C (-) 9 °C - (-) 1 °C (-) 11.1 °C - 6.9 °C (-) 5.5 °C - 13 °C 
Monthly Avg. 
Summer Temp. 26.7 °C– 29.4 °C  19.3 °C - 25 °C  5 °C - 20 °C 17.2 °C - 27.9 °C  16.7 °C - 38.9 °C 
Avg. # of Days 
Below 0 42 85 212 107 118 
Avg. # of growing 
days 220 220 88 181 239 
Avg. Relative 
Humidity 
Annual 70% Annual 71% Annual 50% Annual 54% Annual ~35% 
Monthly 56 - 78% Monthly 52 - 90% Monthly 15-89% Monthly 33 - 80% Monthly 22 - 50% 
Relative 
Humidity 36 - 97% 47 - 94 % 4 - 100 % 22 - 91% 5 - 100% 
Avg. Annual 
Evaporation 1450 mm 1285 mm 1090 mm 1350 mm 37200 mm 
Avg. Daily 
Evaporation 
1.5 mm - 
Jan. 
6.8 mm - 
Jul. 
1.2 mm - 
Dec. 
5.5 mm - 
Jul. 
~0 mm - 
Winter 
6.3 mm - 
July 
~0 mm - 
Jan. 
9.7 mm - 
Jul. 






Table 3.2:  Environmental Parameters - Hydrogeology 





defined units in 
top aquifer zone, 
mixture of clay 
and sand 
Mixed layers of 
sedimentary rock 
subjected to faults 
and upward thrusts 
Layers of basalt 
and interbedded 
sediments 
Large deposits of 
sediments, mostly 
sand and gravel 
 Layer of alluvial 

















Formation - 116 
m 
Alluvial Fill - 
360 - 460 m 
A-B Interbed at 
9.1 m 
Upper Gravel 
Sequence – 6 m 
Sand Lower 
Vadose Zone 
B-C Interbed at 
33.5 m 
Sand Sequence – 
60 m 
C-D interbed 
at 73 m 
Lower Gravel 











Groundwater flow is 
dominated by 




Formation - 95 m Tuff - 550 m Gordon 
Confining Unit - 
0.6 to 9 m 
Gordon Aquifer 
- 23 m 
Surface to 
Groundwater 7.62 m ~20 m 
180 m (9 m of 
interbed) 98 m 240 m 
Soil Dry Bulk 
Density 2.65 g/cm




0.2 0.305 0.17 0.09 N/A 
Groundwater 
Mixing Depth 10 m 3 m 12 m 5 m N/A 
Groundwater 
Darcy Velocity 8.1 m/yr 2.9 m/yr 0.75 m/yr 22 m/yr 1.4 m/yr 
Saturated Zone 
Porosity 0.3 0.035 0.06 0.31 N/A 
Natural Soil 
Recharge Rate 270 mm/yr 
2000 mm/yr shallow 
180 mm/yr deep 70 mm/yr 50 mm/yr 0 
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Table 3.3:  Environmental Parameters - Geochemical Properties 
 SRS E-Area Oak Ridge Idaho RMWC Hanford IDF NNSS Area 5 
 Radionuclides of Interest and Chemical Sorption Distribution Coefficient in mL/g 
Radionuclide Ground Type 





Ac 1100 8500 10000 225 350 35 30 10 
Am 1100 8500 10000 225 350 35 30 100 
Inorganic C 0 0  0.4 20 2 0.5 0 
Cl 0 0  0 0   0 
Cm 1100 8500  4000 350 35 30  
Co 7 30 1000 10 300 30 200 1 
Cs 50 250 10000 500 80 8 200 1 
H3, Kr, Rn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I 0 0.6 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 
Nb 0 0  500 80 8 30  
Ni 7 30  100 80 8 30 100 
Np 0.6 35 10 23 0.8 0.8 1.5 10 
Pa 0.6 35  8 0.8 0.8 1.5 1 
Pb 2000 5000  270 100 10 1000 10 
Po 2000 5000       
Pu 270 5900 10 2500 200 20 15 100 
Ra 5 17  575 10 1 1.4 10 
Se 1000 1000  130 4 0.4 0.7  
Sn 2000 5000  130 80 8 30 100 
Sr 5 17 100 60 10 1 1.4 1 
Tc 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Th, Zr 900 2000  500 300 30 100 100 
U 200 300 10 15.4 10 1 0.6 0 
Data Source Table 10: Kaplan (2006) 
Figure 3-13: 
Solomon (1992) 
Table 2-14: DOE 
Idaho (2007) 
Table 4 and 5: Kaplan and 
Serne (2000) 
Table 3-20: Shott 
et al. (1998) 
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Table 3.4:  Engineered Parameters - Dimensions and Covers 






trenches 6 disposal cells 
1 large disposal 
pit 
6 RH waste 
trenches 
28 cells (pits 
and trenches) 
198 m L x 45.7 m 
W x 4.9 - 7.6 m D; 
100 total acres 
44 acres of total 
land surface 
9 m deep, 7.76 
total acres 
Base - 20 x 200 m; 
Top - 80 x 260 m; 
10 m deep 




3 per cell 1,682,000 m3 130,000 m3 204,000 m3 572,000 m3 
Operational 
Cover 
1.22 m of soil; 
Additional interim 
610 mm of soil 
overlain by HDPE 
membrane 
300 mm of clay 
soil overlain by 
GCL then 600 mm 
of vegetative soil 
900 mm or 
greater of soil 
1 m thick of soil 
overlain by plastic 
sheeting 







Topsoil - 152.4 
mm 
Surface Soil - 1520 
mm 
Topsoil - 305 
mm 
Silt Loam with Pea 
Gravel - 500 mm 




Backfill - 762 mm Filter Layer - 305 mm 
Fine Soil Fill - 
1220 mm 
Compacted 
Topsoil - 500 mm 
Erosion Barrier - 
305 mm Geotextile 
Sand - 305 mm 




- 905 mm Gravel - 150 mm 
Middle Backfill - 
305 mm 
Drainage Layer - 







Mixture - 150 mm 
Drainage Layer - 
305 mm Geomembrane Cobble 
Biointrusion - 
610 mm 
Asphalt Base - 100 
mm 
Geosynthetic Clay 
Clay Barrier with 
Bentonite - 305 
mm 
Sand - 1 m 
Backfill - 610 mm 
Clay Barrier - 305 
mm Grading Fill - 0 
to 3050 mm 
Gravel - 1 m 
Contour Layer - 
305 mm 
Grading Fill up to 
5 m below surface 
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Table 3.5:  Engineered Parameters - Liners 
  SRS E-Area Oak Ridge Idaho RMWC Hanford IDF NNSS Area 5 
Liner 
Parameters 
from top to 
bottom 
 
152.4 mm of 
granite crusher 




Operational Soil - 
305 mm 
Soil - 600 mm 
Crushed Concrete 
and Soil - 900 mm 
Native soil 








Admixture - 500 mm 
Geomembrane Geocomposite Drainage Layer 
Clay - 9150 mm HDPE Liner 
Soil Buffer - 3 m Bentonite Clay/Soil Admixture - 1 m 
 
Table 3.6:  Waste Parameters 















sludges with and 




clothing, trash, and 
miscellaneous solids 
Contaminated 






materials, Vycor glass, 
equipment (i.e. 
gloveboxes and 
ventilation ducts), and 






sludge with fly 
ash, laboratory 
waste, equipment, 
oil in absorbent, 








12, and Sealand 
containers 
No standard waste 
package; material 
and shape are 
determined by waste  

















3.3.1 Savannah River E-Area 
The Savannah River Site (SRS) is located in southwestern South Carolina near the cities of 
Aiken, SC (32 km north), and Augusta, GA (35 km northwest), and separated from Georgia by 
the Savannah River, with a total site area of close to 777 km2 (Westinghouse Savannah River 
Company (WSRC), 2008).  E-Area occupies a total of 200 acres, with 100 acres currently in use 
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and 100 acres reserved for future needs.  Climate at SRS is characterized as subtropical, with 
average annual precipitation of 1,224 mm and average annual temperature of 17.8 °C (Kilgo et 
al., 2005; Phifer et al., 2006; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008; Kabela, 
2011; NOAA, 2012a; NOAA, 2012b).  
The groundwater hydrology underlying SRS consists of several aquifer systems and confining 
layers (see Figure 3.1).  The two aquifer systems of importance to the E-Area are the Upper 
Three Runs and underlying Gordon aquifer units (Mamatey, 2006; Westinghouse Savannah 
River Company (WSRC), 2008).  The Upper Three Runs Aquifer Unit and can be divided into 
three hydrostratigraphic zones with a total thickness of 40 m: an upper aquifer zone that includes 
the vadose zone, an intermittent confining layer called the “Tan Clay Confining Zone”, and a 
lower aquifer zone (Aadland et al., 1995; Denham, 1999; Mamatey, 2006; Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  Within the vadose zone there is an upper and lower 
section, each consisting of clay and sand mixtures, with the upper portion containing a 
comparatively higher percentage of clay (Phifer et al., 2006; Westinghouse Savannah River 
Company (WSRC), 2008).  For the ETs, the distance from the bottom of the disposal facility to 
the water table is 7.62 m (Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  The “tan 
clay” zone is intermittent, allowing water in spots to pass freely between the upper and lower 
aquifer zones.  Below the Upper Three Runs is the 0.6 to 9m thick Gordon confining unit and 23 
m Gordon Aquifer.  At the location of the ETs, contaminant transport from both the Upper Three 
Runs and Gordon aquifer travels to the Upper Three Runs River.  A thick confining layer under 
the Gordon aquifer coupled with positive upward pressure from the underlying Myers Branch 
Aquifer prevents groundwater and contaminants from passing to aquifer systems deeper than the 
Gordon.  E-Area geochemistry (element distribution coefficients [Kd]) was examined for 38 
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generic radionuclides in both sand and clay environments (Kaplan, 2006; Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  
 
Figure 3.1: Hydrology of General Separations Area (Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008). 
Disposal within E-Area is organized by waste activity, with the ETs accepting a majority of the 
lowest level waste.  An ET is a below-grade disposal cell with sloped sides, 198 m long by 45.7 
m wide, ranging in depth from 4.9 to 7.6 m, though ETs may vary a few meters in height and 
width (Phifer et al., 2006; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008). The bottom 
of each ET contains 150 mm of granite dense grade aggregate (also known as “crusher run”) 
underlain by a geotextile filter fabric and compacted soil.  Two ETs have been completed, with 
at least two additional ETs under construction (Collard and Hamm, 2012).  The base of ET #1 is 
sloped toward a concrete sump at one end to collect runoff for analysis and prevent water 
buildup.  The base of ET #2 is sloped toward a 610 mm diameter steel pipe that drains into the 
sump of ET #1 (Jones et al., 2003; Phifer et al., 2006). 
Waste forms are made up of soil, rubble, wood, debris, concrete, equipment, and job control 
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Meyers Branch Confining Unit
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77 percent of total containers used) is the B-25 box, a painted and primed steel box constructed 
out of 12-gauge low-carbon steel with a volume of 2.55 m3 and capable of holding up to 2,720 
kg of LLW (Jones and Li, 2001; Dunn, 2002; Jones et al., 2003).  A similar waste package used 
is the B-12 box, identical in construction but half the volume of a B-25 box; it can hold up to 
2,270 kg.  In addition, “Sealand” containers (a general term for a standard, multi-modal, 
corrugated, painted steel box structure) have also been used for disposal (Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  Each ET is designed to hold the equivalent of 
19,000 B-25 boxes, stacked in rows 4 boxes tall (Phifer et al., 2006; Swingle and Phifer, 2006).  
As waste is placed within an ET, an operational cover 1.22 m thick of previously excavated soil 
is placed over each filled waste section, and compaction occurs as bulldozing equipment passes 
over the soil cover (Phifer, 2004; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  
Once a trench has been completely filled with waste, an interim cover is installed over the 
operational cover consisting of 610 mm of soil topped with a high-density polyethylene (HDPE) 
geomembrane or geotextile coated with a water-shedding component.  The interim cover system 
is to be maintained during the 100-year IC period, with a final cover installed at the end of the IC 
period.  The current closure plan is to use a final cover consisting of multiple layers of fill and 
geosynthetic materials (see Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Proposed final cover system for the E-Area trenches (Phifer et al., 2006). 
3.3.2 Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility 
Situated in the south-central part of Washington State along the Columbia River, this site 
occupies 1,517 km2 and is located adjacent to the city of Richland and near the cities of Pasco 
(25 km southeast) and Kennewick (25 km southeast) (Neitzel et al., 2000; Mann et al., 2001; US 
Census Bureau, 2012).  The proposed Immobilized Low-Activity Waste Disposal facility site 
(also known as the IDF) is found within the 200 East Area.  The Hanford climate is characterized 
as mid-latitude semi-arid, with average annual precipitation of 173 mm and average annual 
temperature of 11.9 °C (Farnsworth and Thompson, 1982; Mann et al., 2001; Hoitink et al., 
2005; NOAA, 2012a; Hanford Meteorological Station, 2013; NOAA, 2013c).  
The geology present at the IDF is comprised of basalt (Columbia River Basalt Group) overlain 
by the Ringold Formation followed by the Hanford Formation (see Figure 3.3) (Reidel and 
Horton, 1999; Mann et al., 2001).  Within the area of the IDF, the Ringold Formation is 95 m 
thick and consists of layers of fluvial gravel sediments.  The overlying Hanford Formation is up 
to 116 m thick and contains alternating layers of gravel and sandy sediments (Reidel and Horton, 
 
3 to 5 Percent Slope
152 mm Topsoil
762 mP Controlled Compacted Backfill
25 mm Geotextile Filter Fabric
30 mm Gravel Drainage Layer
51 mm GCL
1.016 m Controlled Compacted Backfill
(minimum)
}
1.2 m  Clean Layer
30 mm Erosion Barrier
25 mm Geotextile Filter Fabric
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1999; Mann et al., 2001).  Sandy and silty surface sediments form deposits found on the southern 
part of the IDF site and range in thickness from 3-15 m.  The water table historically begins at 
the boundary of the Ringold and Hanford formations and is the primary pathway for 
contaminants to reach the Columbia River (Mann et al., 2001).  Activities at the Hanford Site 
have artificially raised the water table to 98 m below the surface (Cole et al., 1997; Mann et al., 
2001).  The water table is expected to revert to the historical level of 103 m after waste 
management activities have ended.  The geochemistry of the 200 East Area is represented by 
sand and gravel conditions for the Hanford and Ringold formations (Mann et al., 2001).  The 
“chemically impacted in far-field sand sequence” (pH between 8-11, ionic strength between 0.01 
moles per liter [M] and 0.1 M, and low radionuclide activity) and “chemically impacted in far-
field gravelly sequence” (same properties as sand sequence with Kds corrected for gravel) are 
vadose zone properties for the Hanford Formation.  The chemical impaction is a result of glass 
and concrete leachates from the waste zone contributing to higher ionic strength and pH.  “Far-
field gravel sequence” (pH of 8, ionic strength between 0.005 M and 0.01 M) represents 
groundwater zone properties for gravel in the Ringold (Kaplan and Serne, 2000; Mann et al., 
2001).  It is assumed that the groundwater dilutes all major solutes down to natural background 
levels (Kaplan and Serne, 2000).  Kds are expected to change with time for the vadose zone, 
while groundwater Kds are expected to remain constant. 
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Figure 3.3: West to east cross-section of the IDF disposal site geology (Mann et al., 2001). 
 Though still in the planning stages, waste estimates for the IDF are 204,000 m3 of non-
radioactive and low-activity tank waste that would fill about 80,000 waste packages placed 
within six remotely handled (RH) waste trenches (Burbank et al., 2000).  Preliminary designs for 
each disposal trench use a double liner, with a layer of bentonite clay/soil admixture overlain by 
a geomembrane and a second layer identical in composition placed on top of the first.  A leachate 
detection system is planned between the bottom of the second clay/soil layer and the 
geomembrane of the first layer, with a leachate collection system above the second 
geomembrane.  A potential operational layer consisting of crushed concrete followed by soil may 
be placed over the double liner.  Proposed trench dimensions are 20 m x 200 m at the base, with 
3:1 sloped sides rising 10 m up to the top with dimensions of 80 m x 260 m (Burbank et al., 
2000; Mann et al., 2001).  
The candidate waste form for the IDF is silicate glass monoliths, with each monolith placed into 
cylindrical stainless steel (304L) waste package (Mann et al., 2001).  The glass would take up 
approximately 85 percent of the waste package, filling the remaining void space with silicate 
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Gravelly Sand to Gravel






























sand, and welded shut.  One plan is to group canisters into a number of small units (cells) and 
place them in the disposal facility in four layers of cells, with a layer of backfill separating each 
layer of waste.  Waste packages would be RH and placed in the disposal facility by crane. 
All waste layers would be covered by up to 1 m thick of soil to limit infiltration, provide a 
working surface, and shield workers from radiation.  Plastic sheeting would also be used to limit 
infiltration.  The proposed final closure plan is to use a modified RCRA Subtitle C multilayer 
cover to control infiltration and inadvertent intruders (see Figure 3.4) (Fayer et al., 1999; 
Burbank et al., 2000).  This cover would consist of nine layers with a design life of 500 years, 
with an underlying base layer comprised of grading fill from excavated soil to bring the facility 
up to 5 m below ground surface, with a two percent slope from center to end. 
 
Figure 3.4: Proposed final cover system for the IDF (Burbank et al., 2000). 
Cover 9egetation Mi[ed perennial 
                        grasses and shrubs
Layer   cm Silt loam topsoil 
              with pea gravel admi[ture
Layer   cm Compacted silt 
              loam topsoil
Layer   cm Sand Filter
Layer   cm Gravel Filter
Layer   cm 'rainage Gravel
Layer   cm Lowpermabilty       
              asphalt
Layer   cm Asphalt base course
Layer   m Sand Filter
Layer   m Gravel Filter
Layer  Grading Fill variable 
                thicNness min  cm
Base BacNfill ,ntermin closure to 







3.3.3 Idaho Radioactive Waste Management Complex 
Positioned on the high desert terrain in Southeastern Idaho, the site occupies 2,305 km2 and is 
located near the towns of Arco, ID (11 km west), Blackfoot, ID (37 km southeast), and Idaho 
Falls, ID (51 km east) (DOE Idaho, 2007; US Census Bureau, 2012).  The RWMC is located in 
the southwestern portion of the site covering an area of 174 acres, with waste management 
operations occupying 97 acres.  The active portion of the facility is named the Subsurface 
Disposal Area (SDA) and takes up 7.76 acres.  Climate at INL is semi-arid sagebrush desert, 
with average annual precipitation of 214 mm and average annual temperature of 5.7 °C (Clawson 
et al., 1989; DOE Idaho, 2007; NOAA, 2013a).   
The geology of the INL site is a mix of basalt with interbedded layers of sediments (DOE Idaho, 
2007).  Basalt flows consist of medium to dark vesicular to dense olivine basalt and range from 
3-15 m in thickness, while sediment layers vary from well sorted to poorly sorted deposits of 
gravel, silt, sand, and clay and are found up to 15 m in thickness.  Beneath the RWMC there are 
ten basalt flows and seven sedimentary interbeds, though only seven basalt flows and three 
interbeds extend across the entire area (see Figure 3.5).  The three interbeds are named for the 
encasing basalt layers, and occur at depths of 9.1 m (A-B interbed), 33.5 m (B-C interbed), and 
73 m (C-D interbed).  Each interbed is known to have discontinuities, though the C-D bed is the 
most continuous.  The water table begins at 180 m below the surface and is part of the Snake 
River Plain Aquifer, a sole source aquifer (DOE Idaho, 2007).  However, sorption is assumed to 
occur only within the interbed layers, as the basalt layers contain enough fractures to allow for 
fast pathways of infiltrating moisture.  This reduces the thickness of the vadose zone to 9 m, and 
Kds for target radionuclides were calculated for the interbed sections (Adler Flitton et al., 2001; 
Holdren and Broomfield, 2004; DOE Idaho, 2007).  Perched water has also been found above the 
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B-C and C-D interbeds. 
 
Figure 3.5: Unsaturated lithology underlying the SDA (DOE Idaho, 2007). 
Active waste disposal is being carried out within Pits 17-20 of the SDA, one large pit that was 
blasted down into subsurface basalt (DOE Idaho, 2007).  This disposal pit is 9 m deep with 0.6 m 
of soil at the base.   The total area of the pit is 7.76 acres, and is designed to accept a maximum 
of 130,000 m3 of waste.  The facility accepts both contact-handled (CH) and RH (greater than 
500 mrem/hour at 1 m from the waste package surface) waste.  CH waste is placed in containers 
throughout the disposal pit, and RH waste is placed in specialized concrete vaults in the 
southwest corner of the facility. 
Current waste disposal is solely from on-site generation (legacy waste at the RWMC is from 
across the DOE complex) and is disposed within one of several waste package types.  Waste 
forms include contaminated protective clothing, paper, rags, packing material, glassware, tubing, 
















temperature and thermal shock resistant glass made by Corning Incorporated), along with 
contaminated equipment (i.e. gloveboxes and ventilation ducts) and process wastes such as filters 
cartridges and sludges (DOE Idaho, 2007).  Waste packages used are wooden and metal boxes, 
drums, soft-sided reinforced containers, plus other specialty containers for any non-uniform 
waste forms.  Stacked waste height is controlled by the strength of the waste packages and 
administrative controls, with a maximum height of 7.3 m. 
An interim cover of at least 900 mm of soil is installed over filled disposal portions.  Additional 
soil is placed around concrete vaults to aid in shielding.  Four experimental cover designs are 
being evaluated.  These include: a 2 m homogenous soil cover, a 2 m soil cover with a bio-
barrier (300 mm of river cobble sandwiched between 100 mm layers of crushed gravel) at a 
depth of 500 mm below the soil surface, a 2 m soil cover with a bio-barrier at a depth of 1 m 
below the soil surface, and a RCRA cover (a geomembrane overlain by 600 mm of compacted 
clay and 1 m of soil) (Anderson and Forman, 2003; DOE Idaho, 2007).  The current favored 
design is the soil with bio-barrier using an evapotranspiration cover (EVT) (see Figure 3.6).  The 
bottom layer is soil with a minimum thickness of 1.8 m to bring the facility up to grade.  Above 
this is a layer of grading fill to create a 3 percent slope over the entire facility area, then overlain 
by the EVT cover. 
 
Figure 3.6: Proposed final cover system for the RWMC (DOE Idaho, 2007). 
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3.3.4 Environmental Management Waste Management Facility at Oak Ridge   
Partially located within and adjacent to the city of Oak Ridge in eastern Tennessee and bordered 
on two sides by the Clinch River, the Oak Ridge Site occupies 140 km2 of land and is 20 km 
west-northwest of the city of Knoxville (MMES Inc., 1994; Jacobs EM Team, 1998; US 
Department of Energy, 2009; US Census Bureau, 2012).  The only current operating disposal 
facility is the EMWMF (US Department of Energy, 1997b).  This facility is designed to accept 
on-site mixed waste, RCRA regulated hazardous waste, and regulated Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA) wastes (US Department of Energy, 2009).  The Oak Ridge climate is humid 
subtropical or humid continental, with average annual precipitation of 1,370 mm and average 
annual temperature of 14.4 °C (Farnsworth and Thompson, 1982; MMES Inc., 1994; Jacobs EM 
Team, 1998; Hughes et al., 2012; NOAA, 2012a; NOAA, 2013d).   
The site geology is comprised of sedimentary rock layers compressed and folded over one 
another from historic faults and upward thrusts, resulting in carbonate-dominated rock groups 
interbedded with predominately clastic (sand and silt) shale groups (see Figure 3.7) (Hatcher et 
al., 1992; Jacobs EM Team, 1998).  There are two types of hydrologic units spread across the 
site: the Knox aquifer unit, in which groundwater flow is predominately through solution 
conduits; and the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) aquitards, with groundwater flow dominated by 
fractured flow (Solomon, 1992).  Three subsurface sections are present for each unit, a storm 
flow zone, vadose zone, and groundwater zone.  Most groundwater flow occurs laterally in the 
storm flow zone, with groundwater zone flow decreasing with depth.  The vadose zone is highly 
variable, ranging from nonexistent to a thickness of 50 m, with an average of 20 m.  The 
EMWMF sits in an area of the ORR Aquitard, with depth to groundwater 20 m from the surface 
or 3 m below the bottom buffer layer of the disposal facility (Benson et al., 2008; US 
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Department of Energy, 2009).  Experimental Kds were calculated for radionuclides in shale on an 
order-of-magnitude basis (Solomon, 1992).   
 
Figure 3.7: ORR generalized geologic cross-section ((Jacobs EM Team, 1998). 
The EMWMF has been constructed in phases, with five currently finished disposal cells and a 
sixth cell in planning stages (Benson et al., 2008; US Department of Energy, 2009).  Total land 
area is expected to exceed 44 acres, with current total disposal volume at 1,300,000 m3, and an 
additional 382,000 m3 of disposal space planned for cell six (Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, 
2001; Benson et al., 2008; US Department of Energy, 2009).  Each disposal cell varies in size 
but is identical in design, with a double composite liner and leachate collection and detection 
system.  The liner system base is a 915 mm layer of clay overlain by a 1.5 mm HDPE 
geomembrane (Jacobs EM Team, 1998; Benson et al., 2008).  The leak detection system rests 
over the geomembrane consisting of a geonet placed between two non-woven geotextiles and 
followed by a second 1.5 mm HDPE geomembrane.  The leachate collection system is above the 
second geomembrane and consists of a 305 mm gravel layer sandwiched between two 
geotextiles and covered with a 305 mm operational soil protective layer.  A 3 m buffer layer of 
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clay fill is beneath the liner base (Benson et al., 2008). 
The EMWMF receives waste from site environmental remediation, contaminated building 
demolition debris, and general site operations.   Waste forms including demolition debris, 
contaminated soil, contaminated clothing, trash, contaminated sediments/sludges, and 
miscellaneous solids (Jacobs EM Team, 1998).  There is no standard waste package, and the 
waste package is determined by waste source and risk.  
During the operational phase, an interim cover is placed over completed sections consisting of a 
minimum 305 mm of clay soil, to reduce infiltration and bring the area up to final grade (Jacobs 
EM Team, 1998).  A water-shedding layer (geosynthetic clay (GCL) or asphalt) is placed over 
the clay to further limit infiltration, followed by a top 610 mm layer of vegetative soil to reduce 
erosion.  Final cover design for the EMWMF is a 5 m multi-component cover system, and 
incorporates the interim cover (see Figure 3.8) (Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, 2001; Benson et 
al., 2008).  
 
Figure 3.8: Proposed final cover system for the EMWMF (Benson et al., 2008). 
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3.3.5 Nevada National Security Site Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site 
Located within the high desert of Southern Nevada, the NNSS occupies over 3,500 km2 and is 
found near the communities of Pahrump (80 km southwest) and Indian Springs (42 km 
southeast) (Shott et al., 1998; Bechtel Nevada, 2006; US Census Bureau, 2012).  The Area 5 
Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) is located in the southeastern portion of the 
NNSS within the northern region of the Frenchman Flat formation, an alluvium-filled closed 
basin containing a dry lake bed (Shott et al., 1998).  The site takes up 732 acres, with the RWMS 
operating on 144 acres.  The facility contains legacy on-site disposal, which began in 1961, 
legacy off-site disposal, which began in 1978, and current disposal from on-site and off-site 
sources (Bechtel Nevada, 2006).  The disposal facility also contains a mixed waste cell allowed 
under RCRA interim status.  The NNSS is situated in a transitional region between the Nevadan 
and Mojave Desert, with an intermountain desert climate (Shott et al., 1998).  Average annual 
precipitation at Frenchman Flat is 124 mm and average annual temperature is 15.2 °C (Shott et 
al., 1998; Soule, 2006; NOAA, 2013b).  
The Area 5 RWMS and encompassing Frenchman Flat basin are surrounded and underlain by 
Proterozoic and Paleozoic carbonate sedimentary rocks and Cenozoic volcanic rocks (Shott et 
al., 1998).  Layers of volcanic tuff and infilling alluvium overlie the basement sedimentary rock 
formations.  The surface alluvium layer has an estimated thickness of 360 - 460 m (Reynolds 
Electrical & Engineering Co., 1994; Snyder et al., 1994).  Underlying the alluvium is a layer of 
interbedded Tertiary ash-fall and ash-flow welded and bedded tuff, with an estimated thickness 
of over 550 m (see Figure 3.9) (Raytheon Services Nevada, 1991).   Distance to the water table is 
approximately 240 m.  A combination of low precipitation coupled with high year-round 
evaporation rates have resulted in upward groundwater movement within the top 35 m of soil, 
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with no movement of water throughout the remainder of the vadose zone.  Distribution 
coefficients (Kds) for inventory radionuclides were calculated for alluvium (Shott et al., 1998; 
Bechtel Nevada, 2006).  
 
Figure 3.9: Subsurface geology below the RWMS at Area 5 (Shott et al., 1998). 
Active waste disposal takes place within 28 pits and trenches dug into the alluvium (Shott et al., 
1998; Bechtel Nevada, 2004; Bechtel Nevada, 2006).  Each disposal pit ranges in length from 
130 – 345 m and from 12 – 61 m in width.  Trenches range from 77 – 345 m in length and 12 – 
14 m in width (see Figure 3.10).  There are two types of pits with varying depth, with a standard 
pit ranging from 3.1 – 6.7 m for most LLW disposal (trenches have the same depth range), and a 
deeper version of 7.4 – 9 m for waste that contains quantities of radium-producing isotopes 











volume of 572,000 m3.  None of the pits or trenches contain an engineered bottom liner, with 
waste placed on leveled native soil.  
 
Figure 3.10: Waste zone and proposed final cover system for Area 5 (Bechtel Nevada, 2006). 
Waste is accepted from on-site and off-site generators across the country, including large 
portions of the total waste volume from Rocky Flats, Fernald, and Mound (Shott et al., 1998).  
The RWMS contains a variety of waste forms, including cement-solidified tritium, cement-
solidified sludge, sewage sludge with fly ash, laboratory waste, contaminated equipment, oil in 
absorbent, contaminated soil, D&D debris, trash, construction wastes, uranium residues, and 
thorium residues.  Waste packages were originally made of plywood and cardboard.  At present 
disposal involves the use of standardized steel boxes with dimensions of 1.2 m x 1.2m x 2.1 m or 
0.61 m x 1.2 m x 2.1 m (Shott et al., 1998).  Several types of steel drums have also been used.  
All waste containers are stacked to a height of 1.2 m below the original grade of each disposal pit 
or trench. 
As sections of a pit or trench become filled, a bulldozer pushes native alluvium over the waste in 
a single lift as an interim cover.  The material is scraped of large diameter material over 50 mm 


















approximately 2.4 m, with a final grade of 1.2 m above the surrounding area, and will remain in 
place during the 100-year IC period (see Figure 3.10).  The final cover design calls for a 4 m 
monolayer EVT planted with natural vegetation (Bechtel Nevada, 2006).   
Waste subsidence is expected to take place as waste packages degrade and collapse on voids 
within waste containers.  Most subsidence is expected to take place and be repaired during the IC 
period, though estimates are that 25 percent of wooden boxes and steel drums and 80 percent of 
steel boxes will not have degraded by that time, leading to future subsidence (Bechtel Nevada, 
2006).  However, it is expected that movement of unconsolidated alluvium will fill in any cracks 
formed from cover subsidence. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Building stakeholder and regulatory confidence in the performance of a NSDF would be assisted 
through the use of an assessment methodology across all NSDFs that is standardized when 
appropriate, but that also reflects necessary variations.  The wide variety of environmental 
properties and waste streams present at each site preclude the use of a uniform engineered barrier 
design or waste package, such that a flexible approach to analyzing the source term is needed.  
However, an adaptive process that selects optimal combinations of waste packages and 
engineered barriers adapted to site/waste specific characteristics in a standardized way across 
sites would improve the ability to compare various assessments of performance.  For areas 
inherently difficult to compare, such as humid vs. arid sites or leachable vs. stable waste forms, a 
methodology that recognizes and adapts to these differences in a standardized fashion would also 
help to build confidence in performance.  This article compares and aggregates parameters for 
five state of the practice DOE NSDFs.  A system of components approach could be a useful 
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piece of a future more standardized methodology that is flexible enough to adapt to any 
combination of disposal facility engineering, waste-specific parameters, and site-specific 
environmental factors.  This would also allow insights into a facility’s performance drivers by 
highlighting the interactions among overall system components.
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CHAPTER 4 
APPLICATION OF A PROPOSED GENERIC LLW WASTE PACKAGE ANALYSIS WITH 
CHANGING INFILTRATION IN A HUMID ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
Disposal of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) is regulated by a set of performance objectives 
established to ensure protection to human health and the environment from radiological hazards.  
These limits are typically represented as an activity per unit volume, over a period of time, at a 
set distance from the disposal facility.  For waste generated by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) this limit applies 1,000 years after the end of disposal operations at a distance 100 meters 
(m) downgradient or downwind from the facility (US Department of Energy, 1999c).  A near 
surface disposal facility (NSDF) is a LLW disposal technology designed to handle waste streams 
for a specific site.  A performance assessment (PA) is conducted to establish an allowable 
inventory, based on specific radionuclides; and to demonstrate facility compliance with the DOE 
performance objectives using a site conceptual model.   
We suggest that a NSDF is best conceptualized as a three-component system.  Waste form, waste 
composition, and waste package represent the disposal component; facility bottom and cover 
layer(s) represent the engineered facility component; and site-specific features including 
precipitation and soil composition represent the environmental component (Rustick et al., 2015).  
The performances of these three components are linked, and this conceptual approach enables 
the assessment of a NSDF in an integrated manner. 
Large uncertainties are present in predicting the processes and events that may occur over a 
1,000-year timespan.  One common simplifying assumption is that waste packages are fully 
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degraded, or are compromised through mechanical processes, by the end of the DOE standard 
100-year institutional control (IC) period.  This eliminates a barrier to waste movement within 
the “waste zone”, defined as the space within the disposal facility where waste is contained.  This 
assumption is considered conservative.  However, actual facility performance could be 
significantly different, compared to assumed performance, if waste packages remained intact up 
to and beyond the end of ICs, providing an additional level of isolation for the contained waste. 
In this article, we describe the development of an analytical approach for a generic NSDF, in a 
humid environment, that is based on the assumption of an intact waste package for predicted 
periods of time.  Our focus was on the waste constituents that could be available for transport to 
the surrounding environment (the source term) under this assumption.  Our objective was to 
analyze scenarios that involved different degradation rates for buried waste packages to evaluate 
effects on facility performance. 
4.2 Near Surface Disposal Facilities 
Disposal of LLW by the DOE is governed by a set of performance objectives as stated within 
DOE Order 435.1, under the self-regulating authority given to DOE by Congress in the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (US Department of Energy, 1999b).  These performance 
objectives are further defined within DOE Manual 435.1 as release limits of radionuclides from a 
NSDF in terms of an annual dose to a member of the public at the boundary of the facility, taken 
to be 100 m (US Department of Energy, 1999c).  A conceptual model is developed to provide a 
basis for estimating the release of waste from the NSDF (source term), movement of the waste 
through the environment (fate and transport), the ways through which a member of the public is 
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exposed to the waste (exposure routes), and the ultimate dose to this individual (Shott et al., 
1998; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008). 
Under the current DOE requirements (US Department of Energy, 1999b), estimation of 
performance for a disposal facility is conducted for three time periods.  The operational phase is 
the period of active waste disposal.  This is followed by a 100-year IC period.  The facility is 
assumed to be actively monitored by site personnel, and all necessary repairs made to the 
engineered barriers.  Following the end of IC, the facility must perform adequately for an 
additional 900 years under the assumption that no additional repairs or human modifications will 
be made to the facility.  
Since long-term field data do not exist to demonstrate how a facility will behave for periods of 
1,000 years, conceptual models are needed to provide the basis for estimation of long-term 
facility performance.  In order to bound the uncertainties of modeling an environmental system 
over 1,000 years, simplifying assumptions, typically conservative, are employed.  As a portion of 
the source term calculation, many PAs assume that all waste packages within the disposal facility 
have degraded, to the point of mechanical failure, by the end of the IC period.   The result is that 
all waste constituents of potential concern (COPCs) within the disposal facility are available for 
transport to environmental receptors prior to the end of ICs (DOE Idaho, 2007; Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  The resulting source term includes all remaining 
waste COPCs within the disposal facility.  This approach is believed to be conservative, since the 
waste packages are no longer available as a barrier to waste transport from the disposal facility; 
however, such an approach also specifically conflicts with the definition of the IC period, 
wherein facility performance is monitored and required corrective actions taken.  Thus, better 
estimates of the actual performance of waste forms are called for.  
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Waste packages were originally made of wood and other readily degradable materials.  Most 
modern waste packages are primed and painted steel boxes (Shott et al., 1998; Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  These metal containers are designed for the 
transportation of material from waste generation areas to disposal in engineered landfills.  They 
are watertight and able to withstand several tons of overburden at the time of disposal (Jones and 
Li, 2001).   
However, once the lid of a container degrades to the point of failure, the overburden material can 
collapse into the container (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  Figure 4.1 demonstrates the progression of 
waste package failure and cover collapse as part of an engineered facility conceptual model 
developed by site staff at Savannah River (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  This collapse leads to 
subsidence in the engineered cover of the NSDF, increasing infiltration into the waste zone.  
Damage to the facility engineered cover is readily fixed during the IC period, but following the 
end of ICs any new damage would not be addressed.  Published reports by DOE staff have 
identified post-IC subsidence as a major source of concern in meeting performance objectives 
(Jones and Phifer, 2002; Phifer, 2004; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).   
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Figure 4.1:  Engineered facility subsidence conceptual model constructed by Savannah River staff (Jones and 
Phifer, 2002). 
For the 2008 Savannah River E-Area PA, it was assumed that an unspecified combination of 
container degradation and a mechanical accelerating agent (e.g., static surcharge, dynamic 
compaction) at the end of the IC period will cause all remaining intact waste packages to 
structurally fail and collapse.  To compensate for unknown and variable container degradation 
rates, the accelerating agent will be designed to compact the waste zone to the maximum extent 
possible.  This in turn would eliminate the potential for future subsidence caused by degrading 
waste packages and remove any remaining void space.  This provides the rationale for the “no 
intact waste package” assumption. 
However, the above assumptions are unlikely to provide an accurate representation of waste 
package corrosion over time and, therefore, actual facility performance would be underestimated.  
Studies have shown that metal structures buried in soil undergo well-understood, time-variable 
rates of corrosion depending on the metal and soil type (Romanoff, 1957; Szklarska-Smialowska, 
1986; Velázquez et al., 2009).  In moist soils, buried iron and steel containers will commonly 
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undergo pitting corrosion.  Pits will form on the metal surface and work their way through the 
metal structure (Mansfeld, 1987; Bradford, 2000).  The rate of this type of corrosion can be 
constant or slowing over time, depending on the soil conditions.  
One study, published in 1957 by the U.S. National Bureau of Standards (NBS), was designed to 
measure corrosion of different metals in a variety of soil types.  The study found that corrosion 
of iron is dependent on soil corrosivity and soil aeration (Romanoff, 1957).  Soil corrosivity is 
based on the characteristics of the soil (e.g. pH levels, Cl- concentration, soil resistivity) and 
determines the initial rate of corrosion.  Soil aeration is based on the profile of the soil 
overburden and is related to grain size and depth from ground surface.  This determines the 
change in the corrosion rate over time.   
In 1989, additional work was published by Mughabghab and Sullivan, mirroring the NBS study, 
but specifically looking at carbon steels (Mughabghab and Sullivan, 1989).  Their objective was 
to show that carbon steel behaved similarly to the types of irons studied by the NBS.  
Mughabghab and Sullivan demonstrated that carbon steels did, in fact, follow corrosion 
relationships similar to those for wrought iron, one of the metals contained within the NBS 
study.  Both studies showed that in well-aerated soils with high sand content, good drainage, and 
near the ground surface, the rate of corrosion drops abruptly over time.  In poorly aerated soils, 
containing mostly clays with poor drainage, that are found deeper beneath the ground surface, 
the corrosion rate slows much less aggressively. 
An eight-year study of buried metal boxes at the Savannah River Site (SRS) was conducted from 
1993 to 2001 to extrapolate site-specific corrosion over the IC period (Dunn, 2002).  Four carbon 
steel boxes were filled with simulated waste, sealed, and buried in native soil (Figure 4.2).  Two 
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of the boxes were stacked boxes under 1.22 m of soil.  The other two boxes were buried 
individually under an additional meter of soil.  In 2001, the top box from the stacked group was 
exhumed for testing, leaving the other three available for future tests.  Three important 
observations were noted: (1) the lid of the top box was collapsed inward, (2) the same box was 
filled to the top with liquid, and (3) the underlying box also was found to have collected moisture 
despite remaining sealed.  This last observation was discovered when the lid of the underlying 
box was accidently moved.  This study demonstrated that it was possible for liquid to accumulate 
within an initially sealed waste package over time and also that this liquid could remain in the 
waste package for an extended period of time. 
 
Figure 4.2:  View of SRS B-25 boxes in 1993 prior to burial (Jones and Li, 2001). 
The combination of historical literature values for corrosion, and the above Dunn study at SRS, 
was the basis for the development of our analysis using waste packages that remain intact 
beyond the operational phase of disposal.  While the Dunn study focused on volume of metal 
loss from each face of the waste package in order to determine how structural integrity would 
change over time as corrosion progressed, we adapted our analysis to calculate the time taken to 
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corrode through the box.  This is important for the potential of a waste package to retain liquid 
and waste material. 
The waste packages and engineered barrier designs were modeled based on disposal practices at 
the SRS E-Area – to provide real-world supplemental data for the analysis (Phifer et al., 2006; 
Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  SRS was chosen because of its 
decades of near-surface LLW disposal operations, the availability of numerous published reports 
and studies on site-specific disposal, and its location in a humid environment.   
4.3 Properties of an Engineered Trench 
A waste package analysis was created based on the current disposal practices for the Engineered 
Trenches at SRS (Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008; Hamm et al., 2013).  
Each Engineered Trench disposal facility is approximately 198 m long by 46 m wide, with a 
depth ranging from 4.88 m to 7.62 m (Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  
Trench sides are sloped at a rate from 1.25:1 to 1.5:1 (horizontal to vertical), and are filled with 
compacted native soil upon facility closure.  The base of each Engineered Trench is compacted 
native soil overlain by a geotextile filter fabric and a top layer of crushed stone 152 mm thick.  
The base is also sloped to a sump located at one end.  
The standard waste package used in this analysis was a steel box with interior dimensions of 1.17 
m by 1.83 m and a height of 1.19 m, yielding a total volume of 2.55 m3 (Jones and Li, 2001; 
Dunn, 2002; Jones and Phifer, 2002).  This type of box (referred to in DOE as a “B-25”) is not 
the only type of steel box waste package used at SRS or at other DOE sites, but it is the most 
common type used in the Engineered Trenches, accounting for approximately 77 percent of 
waste packages.  Each box is constructed of 12-gauge carbon (0.15 percent) hot-rolled, sheet and 
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strip, commercial steel, with a thickness of 2.78 mm (ASTM designation A-569-93) (Dunn, 
2002).  The box lid is sealed with a rubber gasket to reduce liquid infiltration (Jones and Li, 
2001).  Three steel 100 mm tall risers are affixed to the bottom of each box to allow for 
movement and stacking by forklift.   
Each box is designed to hold up to 2,722 kg of solid radioactive waste, and can support a 
uniform load of four fully stacked B-25 boxes, giving a total weight of 1.18 x 104 kg.  A box can 
be filled with a mixture of waste forms.  However, the waste is not always compacted within the 
box, and void space can vary between 10 to 90 percent (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  The interior 
and exterior surfaces of the box are coated with a primer 0.051 mm thick.  The exterior surfaces 
are additionally painted with an alkyd enamel coat 0.032 mm thick. 
Boxes are stacked four high within an Engineered Trench, with a total height of 5.28 m including 
risers  (see Figure 4.3) (Phifer and Wilhite, 2001).  Box stacks are placed next to one another 
within the disposal facility, preventing any significant outward displacement of individual box 
walls.  At SRS, a layer of soil 1.22 m thick is placed over each full section of Engineered Trench 
as an operational cover.  The soil cover reduces the infiltration rate into the waste zone from 
natural precipitation to 286 mm/yr. (Hang et al., 2005; Hang et al., 2008). 
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Figure 4.3:  Stacked B-25 boxes within a generic disposal facility (Jones and Li, 2001). 
Once an Engineered Trench is full, a high-density polyethylene (HDPE) geomembrane is 
installed over the operational soil cover.  The combination soil/geomembrane layers are known 
as the  “interim cover.”  Infiltration through the interim cover into the disposal cell is estimated 
to be 10 mm/yr.  This value was established in literature, using the HELP computer code, within 
the 2004 SRS E-Area closure plan (Hang et al., 2005). 
For this analysis, we assumed dimensions of 198 m long by 46 m wide by a constant depth of 6.5 
m for a hypothetical Engineered Trench.  The dimensions for length and width would be for the 
base of the trench, with no waste placed on the side slopes of the trench.  Boxes would be 
stacked four high with a 1.22 m soil overburden (operational cover).  This created a waste zone 
of approximately 17,000 B-25 boxes.  It was assumed that boxes were exposed to natural 
precipitation rates while each section of the disposal facility was being filled.  At SRS, average 
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annual precipitation is 1,220 mm/yr.     
The estimated time between start and completion for a recent Engineered Trench at SRS (Trench 
#3) was 12 years, and this value was selected for the fill rate of our hypothetical Engineered 
Trench (Hamm et al., 2013).  Actual disposal facility fill rates can vary from year to year.  For 
our analysis, an average time period of one year was chosen between emplacement of a waste 
package and covering the waste with the soil operational cover.  This fill rate was based on 
historical rates for Engineered Trenches #1 and #2 (Westinghouse Savannah River Company 
(WSRC), 2007; Swingle et al., 2008; Millings et al., 2009; Swingle et al., 2010; Swingle et al., 
2011).  This divided the modeled disposal facility into 12 equal sized zones, with a fill rate of 
one zone per year.  It was assumed that no significant box infiltration or corrosion would occur 
before placement of the operational cover.  The layers of primer and paint are designed to resist 
corrosion from precipitation, and there would be no soil cover to depress the lid of the top box. 
In the 2002 Dunn study, the uppermost B-25 box was found to be completely filled with liquid 
after eight years of burial under 1.22 m of compacted native soil (Jones and Li, 2001).  In their 
2002 report, Jones and Phifer selected an average waste package void space of 50 percent within 
their conceptual model (Jones and Phifer, 2002), and we assumed this value for our analysis.  In 
addition, the SRS waste acceptance criteria for E-Area trenches requires that waste contain less 
than one percent free liquid (Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008), and we 
assumed that no liquid was present at the time of waste burial.  With 50 percent void space, the 
volume of liquid in a full waste package is 1,280 L, which over an eight-year period produces a 
fill rate of approximately 160 L/yr.  This box would be the equivalent of the top B-25 box under 
the operational soil cover of an Engineered Trench.  For a footprint area of 2.14 m2 and annual 
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infiltration of 286 mm/yr through compacted native soil, the total volume of infiltration over the 
area of a B-25 box stack is 610 L/yr.   
The underlying box in the Dunn study was estimated to be roughly half filled with liquid despite 
remaining sealed with an intact lid (only visual inspection was conducted).  This resulted in 
approximately 640 L of total liquid, a fill rate of 80 L/yr, and close to 18 percent of the total 
annual infiltration minus the amount collected in box one.  This is the extent of field data to 
estimate the infiltration rates into box two of four within an Engineered Trench, and no field data 
exists for boxes three and four.  Currently, there is also no field data that extends beyond eight 
years, as no date has been set by SRS staff to exhume the remaining boxes.  As a best estimate 
assumption, using the single data point available, boxes three and four would also be estimated 
to fill with liquid at 18 percent of the remaining available infiltration.  For box three of four this 
would result in a fill rate of 67 L/yr, and for box four of four the resulting fill rate would be 55 
L/yr; the remainder of the infiltrating water (L/yr) exits the waste zone. 
Within our analysis, some of the waste packages would be buried for up to 11 years under the 
same depth of soil as the Dunn study.  To account for the difference between the available field 
observation data and the run time of our analysis, it was assumed that the three extra years of 
infiltration into the waste zone would flow around the top box, which would remain full of 
liquid.  Since there are limited field data, it is difficult to address the uncertainty in estimating the 
fraction of liquid that would be partitioned between the underlying boxes and liquid that would 
travel directly to the vadose zone.  We chose therefore to assume that for all boxes under the 
operational cover between years 9 through 11, the overflow from box one becomes available to 
fill the underlying boxes at the same 18 percent of available liquid as calculated in the previous 
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section.  The resulting fill rates are 110 L/yr for box two, 90 L/yr for box three, and 74 L/yr for 
box four, with the remaining L/yr of infiltrating water exiting the waste zone.   
Once the facility is in the IC period, we assumed that the liquid fill rate for all boxes decreases 
proportional to the reduction in the infiltration rate from 286 mm/yr to 10 mm/yr.  Total 
infiltration per box stack at 10 mm/yr is 21.4 L/yr.  For box one this produces a fill rate of 5.6 
L/yr, box two 2.8 L/yr, box three 2.3 L/yr, and box four 1.9 L/yr.  Once box one is filled with 
liquid, the fill rate increases for box two to 3.9 L/yr, for box three to 3.2 L/yr, and for box four to 
2.6 L/yr based on the resulting proportional increase of available infiltration. 
One of the major factors built into this facility analysis is that infiltration is not spatially and 
temporally constant for all waste packages during the operational disposal phase.  The boxes 
disposed in zone one will experience 11 subsequent years of annual infiltration at 286 mm/yr 
until the facility is full and the interim cover is installed.  By contrast, the boxes disposed in zone 
12 will receive infiltration only at the interim cover rate of 10 mm/yr, as the interim cover will be 
installed directly following the end of waste disposal.  The waste sections between zone one and 
zone 12 will receive proportionally varying amounts of total infiltration. 
4.4 Waste Package Degradation 
Two corrosion cases were considered for this analysis, a constant corrosion rate and a 
diminishing corrosion rate.  A constant rate of corrosion was used in several SRS studies to 
support the E-Area PA, including the 2002 Dunn report (Dunn, 2002; Jones and Phifer, 2002; 
Jones et al., 2003).  In addition to the NBS and Mughabghab studies, the aforementioned SRS 
studies also discuss the possibility of a slowing corrosion rate at Savannah River as an alternative 
to a constant corrosion rate.  Release of waste COPCs dissolved in liquid from each box, to be 
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defined as leachate, was assumed to occur when a pit on the face of a box had fully corroded 
through, resulting in a hole for liquid to leave the box. 
The bottom of the box was chosen as the failure point for all waste packages.  This was selected 
for two reasons; first, it would allow for the greatest amount of leachate to flow from the waste 
package.  Second, the box bottom was observed to have the highest corrosion rate of any side 
due to abrasions from the forklifts used to transport waste packages (Dunn, 2002; Jones and 
Phifer, 2002).  The tynes of the forklift scrape the protective coatings from the box, disturbing 
the protective paint layers and exposing the metal underneath (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Picture of B-25 box bottom exhumed from the 2002 Dunn study.  Notice the scrape marks between the 
risers from forklift transport (Dunn, 2002). 
 
For the base case (constant corrosion), extrapolating from the pit growth observed on the 
exhumed box from the Dunn study after eight years, SRS staff estimated that corrosion through 
the box bottom would occur around 42 years from time of burial (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  This 
produces a corrosion rate of 0.066 mm/yr (2.6 mils/yr).  This was assuming that site conditions, 
such as annual infiltration and soil composition, did not change significantly over time.   
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For the slowing corrosion case, corrosion rates were calculated based on work presented in the 
NBS report (Romanoff, 1957; Dunn, 2002; Jones and Phifer, 2002).  The NBS study derived an 
equation for rate of corrosion that followed a power law (equation 1) (Romanoff, 1957): 
ℎ! = 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡!  (1) 
hm = maximum pit depth, in mils;  
k = site dependent soil corrosivity fitting parameter, in mils/yr;  
t = time, in years; 
n = soil aeration dependent fitting parameter  
Well-aerated soils were found to have lower values of n, and poorly aerated soils higher n values.  
The NBS, and subsequent study by Mughabghab and Sullivan, showed that k values are based on 
both the corrosivity and aeration of the soil.  Increasing corrosivity leads to higher k values, and 
better aerated soils have higher k values compared to poorly aerated soils.  This method of 
calculating corrosion rates was also presented as an alternative to a constant corrosion rate within 
the 2002 Jones and Phifer report. 
At SRS, site staff estimated soil conditions to be similar to “very poorly” aerated clay soil with 
low soil corrosivity.  This was reflected in their use of 0.8 for n and 2.6 mils/yr for k in a 2002 
report based on the Dunn study for carbon steels (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  This compares with a 
value of 11 mil/yr for k and 0.75 for n for “very poorly” aerated soils reported in Mughabghab 
and Sullivan (Mughabghab and Sullivan, 1989).  The difference in k values was because the soil 
corrosivity in Mughabghab was relatively high compared to the soil used in the NBS study and 
measured corrosivity values at SRS.  Mughabghab notes that large concentrations of Cl- and SO4-
2 at the sites used in their study likely contributed to the higher soil corrosivity compared to the 
NBS study.  However, the values for n in Mughabghab and SRS are similar, and were expected 
to be similar, since aeration is independent of soil corrosivity. 
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4.5 Corrosion Scenarios 
Four scenarios were examined for each of the two corrosion cases and are described below (see 
Table 4.1).  For this article, only values for waste packages disposed of in zone one and zone 12 
were reported.  This was chosen to demonstrate bounding corrosion effects for the 12-year 
period of disposal.  Table 4.2 shows the values for k and n that were used in the analysis. 
In all scenarios, it was assumed that during the operational phase, all of the buried waste 
packages experience conditions characteristic of “good” soil aeration.  With one end of the 
facility open to the external environment, oxygen is able to penetrate between the waste 
packages and permeate throughout the waste zone.  Once the facility is full and sealed with an 
interim closure cover to start the IC period, ambient air is no longer available to the waste zone.  
We assumed that the waste zone then transitions to a “very poor” aeration environment. 
In the NBS study, “very poor” soil aeration was attributed to clay soils.  This is significant, since 
clay soil types also held moisture against the metal samples in the NBS study, contributing to the 
rate of corrosion.  A justification for our assumption of “very poor” aeration, in addition to 
oxygen availability, was that available moisture from infiltration would continue to flow through 
the waste zone during the IC period.  The moisture would flow over the surfaces of waste 
packages while also keeping humidity levels high within the waste zone.  This conservatively 
may create moisture conditions similar to the “very poorly” aerated soils discussed in the NBS 
study. 
In the first scenario, considered the base scenario since it closely follows SRS data, the corrosion 
fitting parameter k was kept at the measured SRS value of 2.6 mils/yr for both the operational 
and IC periods.  The aeration value n was selected from the NBS study for “good” (0.32) and the 
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SRS value of 0.8 (for “very poor”).  The NBS value was needed since SRS did not consider 
“good” soil aeration during the operational period in their 2002 report (Jones and Phifer, 2002).   
For the second scenario, which is a mix of SRS and NBS findings, the corrosion fitting 
parameter k was doubled to 5.2 mils/yr for “good” aerated soil and kept at the SRS value of 2.6 
mils/yr for “very poor” aerated soil.  In the NBS and Mughabghab and Sullivan studies, it was 
observed that k values for soils with “good” aeration produced values for k that were double or 
more compared to k values for soils with “very poor” aeration.  This scenario was constructed to 
reflect the observations of the NBS study.  The soil aeration values of 0.32 for “good” and 0.8 
for “very poor” were kept from the first scenario, since no changes to soil aeration assumptions 
were made for this scenario. 
The third scenario considered a hypothetical environment that was more corrosive than the SRS 
environment.  The change in k values from “good” to “very poor” soil aeration was kept from 
scenario two, but the k parameter was doubled from 5.2 to 10.4 mils/yr for “good” soil aeration 
and from 2.6 to 5.2 mils/yr for “very poor” soil aeration.  While not at the level of corrosion as 
the Mughabghab study (36 mils/yr for “good” soils and 11 mils/yr for “very poor” soils), it does 
represent environments closer to those considered in the NBS study.  The values for n remained 
the same as those in scenario one and two. 
The fourth scenario was designed to observe the effects of using a more robust waste package 
compared to the 12-gauge B-25 box.  A wide range of carbon steel boxes are used within the 
radioactive waste industry and different thickness boxes are readily available commercially 
(Container Products Corporation, 2016).  In this scenario, the thickness of the carbon steel wall 
for the waste package was changed from 12-gauge (109 mils) to 10-gauge (141 mils) steel.  
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There is precedent for changing waste package material at SRS, as B-25 box materials were 
switched in the 1990s from 14-gauge to 12-gauge carbon steel for disposal in the E-Area 
trenches (Dunn, 2002).  Scenario two was used as the basis for this scenario, including keeping 
the k and n fitting parameters the same as those used in scenario two. 
Table 4.1: Corrosion Scenario Descriptions 
Scenario #  
1 
Base Case: SRS values used for all parameters (with the exception of “good” soil 
aeration, which was not considered by SRS staff) 
  
2 
Mix of SRS and NBS: SRS k and n values kept for “very poorly” aerated soils; 
NBS k and n values used for “good” aerated soils.  k values for “good” soil 
aeration were doubled to reflect results of NBS study 
  
3 
Higher Corrosivity:  Corrosivity fitting parameters doubled for “good” and “very 
poorly” aerated soils to reflect an environment more corrosive to carbon steel; SRS 
soil was estimated to be on the lower range of soil corrosivity compared to soils 
from the NBS study. 
  
4 
More Robust Waste Package:  k and n values were kept identical to scenario 2; 
the waste package wall thickness was increased from 12 to 10 gauge steel to reflect 
a hypothetical change to waste package procurement (such a change has already 
occurred once) 
 
Table 4.2: k, n, and Wall Thickness Values Used 
 
Scenario # 
 1  2  3  4 
k good  2.6  5.2  10.4  5.2 
k poor  2.6  2.6  5.2  2.6 
n good  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.32 
n poor  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
Wall Thickness in mils  109  109  109  141 
 
Once all four corrosion scenarios were modeled, estimates were calculated for the amount of 
leachate that would be released following the hydraulic failure of a waste package.  Since this 
article focuses on the waste disposal in the first and last years of the operational phase, only the 
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zone one waste packages will experience two different fill rates, while the zone 12 waste will 
only experience the IC period fill rates.  It was assumed that holes developed in all four waste 
boxes in a given stack at once, and that all of the leachate contained in the waste packages was 
immediately released to the vadose zone.  This was done to calculate the maximum volume and 
flux of leachate that could be released from the waste zone for the zone one and zone 12 waste 
package groups. 
4.6 Results 
The zone one and zone 12 waste packages for the base and slowing corrosion cases were plotted 
against each other and can be found in Figures 4.5 through 4.8.  Each graph represents one of the 
four corrosion scenarios.  A summary of results from the corrosion scenarios is presented in 
Table 4.3; specifically the time it took for zone one and zone 12 waste packages to reach 
hydraulic failure for the two corrosion cases. 
Using the data from the four corrosion scenarios, the total amount of liquid within all of the 
disposed waste packages for a given year was calculated in L and presented in Table 4.4.  From a 
total of 17,000 waste packages per Engineered Trench, it was estimated that each year 
approximately 1,417 waste packages in 354 stacks are placed in a trench.  Liquid flux (L/m2) for 































Figure 4.5: Pit growth in Box Bottom with Savannah River Corrosion Rates 
Linear Growth Zone 1 
Linear Growth Zone 12 
Slowing Growth Zone 1 



























Figure 4.6: Pit Growth in Box Bottom with Corrosion Rates Changed 
Following Trench Closure  
Linear Growth Zone 1 
Linear Growth Zone 12 
Slowing Growth Zone 1 



























Figure 4.7: Pit Growth in Box Bottom with Corrosion Rates Doubled from 
Scenario 2 
Linear Growth Zone 1 
Linear Growth Zone 12 
Slowing Growth Zone 1 
Slowing Growth Zone 12 
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Table 4.3: Time to Hydraulic Failure for Waste Packages under Corrosion Scenarios 






  1 2 3 4 
      Time in Years 
Constant 
1   42 31 11 43 
12   53 53 32 65 
              
Slowing 
1   111 105 45 144 
12   118 118 56 158 
 








   
 1 2 3 4 
        
Constant 
Total Waste Zone 





1.42E+06 1.39E+06 1.31E+06 1.43E+06 
12 
 
1.88E+05 1.88E+05 9.37E+04 2.42E+05 
  
 
    
Resulting Liquid 
Flux [L/m2] 
1  1877 1827 1734 1883 
12  248 248 124 319 
   
 



























Figure 4.8: Pit Growth in Box Bottom with Scenario 2 Corrosion Rates and 
10-gauge Steel Box Walls  
Linear Growth Zone 1 
Linear Growth Zone 12 
Slowing Growth Zone 1 









   
 1 2 3 4 
        
Slowing 
Total Waste Zone 





1.64E+06 1.62E+06 1.43E+06 1.71E+06 
12 
 
4.78E+05 4.78E+05 2.01E+05 6.56E+05 
  
 
    
Resulting Liquid 
Flux [L/m2] 
1  2160 2140 1890 2258 
12  631 631 265 866 
 
4.7 Discussion 
A few initial insights can be made.  The spread between the first and last waste package zones 
are the highest in scenario four at 14 years for the slowing corrosion case, but are equally high at 
22 years in scenarios two and four for the constant corrosion case.  In scenarios one, two, and 
four, representing lower corrosivity environments, there is the potential for waste packages to 
remain leachate-tight beyond 100 years under the slowing corrosion case.  Conversely, in a 
higher corrosivity environment represented by scenario three, some of the early waste packages 
could develop holes before the installation of the interim cover. 
As time progresses during the IC period, the corrosion behavior of the buried waste packages 
will have impacts on the monitoring and maintenance of the NSDF.  If a waste package or group 
of waste packages begin to fail during this period, the liquid contained within the waste packages 
will be visible to environmental monitoring as the leachate flows downwards into the vadose 
zone.  At current DOE NSDF sites, two common forms of environmental monitoring are pan 
lysimeters and vadose zone moisture probes (National Research Council, 2007).  Lysimeters 
collect liquid over a defined area for measurement and sampling, while moisture probes can 
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detect changes in soil pore moisture.  Both of these methods would be able to detect an increase 
in soil liquid from a hydraulically failed waste package.  However, an increase in vadose zone 
leachate could also be mistaken for cover system failure, or vise-versa, for a monitoring method 
that did not allow for sample removal and radionuclide analysis of leachate.  This will influence 
the selection of monitoring methods, as at least one form of leachate monitoring (e.g., pan 
lysimeter) must allow for such sampling.   
As a related measure, there could be the potential to use estimates of the amount of liquid leaving 
each waste package as a performance confirmation metric.  Through monitoring of the vadose 
zone directly beneath the disposal facility (or other form of leachate collection), an observed 
spike in radionuclide concentration could be correlated to the formation of a hole in a waste 
package.  This would help quantify the rate of box corrosion.  The use of tracer material specific 
to box row could increase the resolution of the observations by identifying corrosion rates by the 
vertical location of the box within the waste zone. 
Failure of waste packages after the end of the 100-year IC period, as predicted by most of the 
slowing corrosion scenarios, presents challenges for the final closure of a NSDF.  As mentioned 
previously, the DOE considers waste zone subsidence as a major failure potential for a NSDF at 
Savannah River.  The proposed remedy for this is some form of mechanical compaction to 
remove remaining void space within the waste zone before a final facility cover system is 
installed (Phifer et al., 2006).  The presence of leachate in waste packages within a portion or 
over the entire waste zone could compromise the effectiveness of the mechanical compaction.  
Leachate could be released in large quantities over a short period of time to the vadose zone.  It 
could also mix with the soil of the interim cover creating a hazard for site workers performing 
the mechanical compaction. 
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For existing NSDFs, in order to avoid potential problems from performing mechanical 
compaction on waste packages that still contain leachate, it may be advisable to delay closing a 
facility until an acceptable majority of waste packages have hydraulically failed.  Assuming this 
could be done from an administrative standpoint (current rules within DOE Order 435.1 require a 
facility to be closed after a 100 year IC period), there are several additional benefits from a 
facility performance standpoint.  The additional time will allow for the lids and bottoms of waste 
packages to more fully corrode before mechanical compaction is applied.  Void space remaining 
within the waste zone, either from no compaction or after incomplete compaction as a result of 
insufficient corrosion of waste packages, was identified in reports following the 2002 Dunn 
study and the 2008 E-Area PA as potential causes of engineered cover subsidence following the 
end of ICs (Jones et al., 2003).  Additional time before compaction will also allow for further 
decay of radionuclides in the leachate of waste packages that had not yet failed. 
For future NSDF to better incorporate the concept of a systems approach to waste management, 
it will be important to consider type, handling, and the corrosion environment for waste packages 
during the planning phase of the NSDF.  Scenario four dealt with choosing a different type of 
waste package, and demonstrated an over 20-year extension of the hydraulic life of that waste 
package.  This may be advantageous for a waste form that contains a high fraction of short-lived 
mobile radionuclides that would benefit from extra time in isolation from the surrounding 
environment.  It could also be detrimental if mechanical compaction cannot be delayed beyond 
the 100 year IC period.  Cost is another consideration, as the added steel will increase the price 
per box.  The cost for a 12-gauge B-25 box in 2001 was approximately $523 (Phifer and Wilhite, 
2001).  Assuming even a 10 percent premium for the 10-gauge box yields a cost of $575, and a 
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cost difference between the two boxes over an entire Engineered Trench (17,000 boxes) of 
$884,000. 
Waste package handling, while not specifically addressed by any individual corrosion scenario, 
would change all scenarios by affecting the box bottom corrosion rate.  The current method of 
using a forklift for transportation damages the box bottom by removing the protection of the 
primer and paint.  A modified forklift with padded tynes would keep the protective coating.  
Another transport method would be to fit the B-25 box in a sling and lift the box into the waste 
zone by crane, as has been done in reverse for waste retrieval at Oak Ridge (Turner et al., 2006).  
Waste packages could also be transported on wooden pallets or suspended in cargo nets similar 
to waste removal techniques for steel drums at Hanford (DeRosa et al., 2000).   
Lengthening the hydraulic lifespan of a waste package may be advantageous if the waste 
package is in a high corrosion environment similar to scenario three.  However, a long lifespan 
could be detrimental in a low corrosion environment similar to scenario two if it interferes with 
mechanical compaction.  Waste packages could therefore be selected to ensure that all waste 
packages will fail before the end of ICs.  This could mean changing waste package procurement 
for thinner box bottoms, or designing waste packages with plugs that are designed to degrade 
under specific conditions.  Another option would be to fill in waste package void space with 
grout or other solid material to prevent infiltrating liquid from mixing with waste.  Grouting 
waste packages would also eliminate subsidence potential.  However, the additional weight 
provided by grout material would necessitate that grouted waste packages be placed under non-
grouted waste packages to avoid overloading the underlying boxes, though grouting all waste 
packages solves this problem. 
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A hybrid approach could be considered if it was advantageous for certain waste packages to 
retain leachate and grouting was not an option.  This would involve using heavier gauge waste 
packages for early years of waste disposal and lighter gauge waste packages closer to the end of 
the operational phase.  Since early waste package are subjected to a number of years of 
infiltration through an operational cover, they would gain more time before hydraulic failure 
from the thicker steel walls.  Later waste packages not subjected to as much infiltration might 
perform the same as the earlier heavy waste packages while saving on cost from thinner walls. 
As a result of a number of simplified assumptions built into our analysis, there are several areas 
of further study that could have a significant effect on the results provided above.  Liquid 
buildup within waste packages could provide a mechanism for earlier development of holes, as 
pressure is exerted from accumulated liquid on waste package sections weakened from corrosion 
pits.  In addition to corrosion of waste package walls, the working life of the gasket seals and 
edge welds of a B-25 box are unknown, and could lead to hydraulic failure before the box 
bottom over the 100-plus years estimated under several of the corrosion scenarios.  Another issue 
is the presence of microbial activity within the waste package.  Depending on a number of 
factors, including waste compositions, waste package leachate, microbial colonies, and oxygen 
levels, corrosion could become accelerated within the interior of the waste package in yet 
unknown ways. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Our analysis of a general LLW NSDF in a humid environment has shown a wide variation in 
corrosion rates depending on the assumed type of corrosion and soil conditions.  All of the 
scenarios, under a constant rate of corrosion, developed holes in waste packages during the IC 
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period.  However, with a low enough corrosion rate, some waste packages undergoing a slowing 
corrosion rate could develop holes at times beyond final site closure.  On the opposite end, under 
a high enough corrosion rate some waste packages could develop holes before the installation of 
an interim cover.  Additional study is needed to assess the effects of leachate buildup within 
waste packages and the presence of microbial activity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 WASTE ZONE LEACHATE BUILDUP AND RELEASE FROM A LLW DISPOSAL 
FACILITY WITH CHANGING INFILTRATION AND CORROSION PARAMETERS 
5.1 Introduction 
The United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE) manages the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste (LLW) through a set of performance objectives, designed to protect human 
health and the environment from the hazards of radionuclide exposure (US Department of 
Energy, 1999b).  These performance objectives control the amount of LLW that can be placed 
within a near surface disposal facility (NSDF).  Disposal limits for each radionuclide are defined 
based on maximum permissible ground and surface water and air radionuclide concentrations at 
a set distance from the NSDF, along with scenarios in which individuals disturb the buried waste 
following facility closure.  The DOE has determined that all of performance objective must be 
met for 1,000 years following the end of waste burial operations, and releases from the facility 
are calculated for meeting performance at a distance 100 meters (m) downgradient or downwind 
from the facility (US Department of Energy, 1999c).  This analysis, in which site conceptual and 
predictive models are used to demonstrate that a given design of NSDF and proposed inventory 
will meet all performance objectives, is known as a performance assessment (PA).   
In this article, we describe the development of an analytical approach for estimating leachate 
buildup within waste packages buried in a generic NSDF, in a humid environment.  This 
approach was based on the assumption of an intact waste package for predicted periods of time.  
Our objective was to analyze different infiltration situations based on the length of a NSDF 
operational period and the subsequent impacts on facility performance. 
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5.2 Near Surface Disposal Facilities 
We evaluated a NSDF as an integrated system of three components, instead of an engineered 
facility that is designed and operated independent of waste and surrounding environment as 
proposed in a previous article by Rustick et al. (Rustick et al., 2015).  The basis of this study is 
that waste form, waste composition, and waste package represent the disposal component; 
facility bottom and cover systems represent the engineered facility component; and site-specific 
environmental features, including precipitation and soil composition, represent the 
environmental component (Rustick et al., 2015).  The three components and their respective 
performance are interrelated, allowing for the assessment of a NSDF to be conducted in an 
integrated fashion.   
Past practice for designing NSDFs at DOE sites and the accompanying PAs typically began with 
the selection of several cover systems of increasing robustness designed to limit infiltration into 
the waste zone, defined as the isolating location within the NSDF containing LLW (Phifer, 
2004).  Each cover system was designed for three distinct time periods of a facility lifespan.  The 
first is the operational period, the period in which parts of the facility are still open and receiving 
waste.  As sections fill, they are covered with a simple cover, such as compacted native soil, to 
facilitate runoff, provide a working surface for equipment, and reduce infiltration into the waste 
zone (Hang et al., 2005; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).   
Once the facility is filled to capacity, the waste zone is further protected from infiltration by the 
installation of an interim cover.  This is usually installed over the operational cover, is designed 
to be much less permeable to infiltration, and is constructed from various materials including 
geomembranes, asphalt, and cement (Cook et al., 2004).  The NSDF is then maintained by site 
	 90	
staff for a 100-year period that includes the active monitoring and management of the cover 
system.  This period is referred to as the institutional control (IC) period.  At the end of the IC, a 
final cover designed to last for hundreds of years without intervention is installed over the 
NSDF, and the facility is deemed officially closed.  The NSDF must continue to meet 
performance objectives for an additional 900 years, giving a total of 1,000 years for compliance. 
In order to model the subsequent performance of the aforementioned system over 1,000 years, 
simplifying assumptions are typically employed for the behavior of waste packages in the waste 
zone over time.  Calculations are made of the transport of radionuclides contained in liquid 
released from the facility, known as leachate, to a potential receptor at the 100 m compliance 
boundary.  As a way to provide an upper bound for the values for leachate released from a NSDF 
(the facility “source term”), many PAs assume aggressive corrosion of all metal waste packages 
within a NSDF, so that most waste packages have corroded to the point of collapse by the end of 
the IC period.  The result is that all waste constituents of potential concern (COPCs) within the 
disposal facility are available for transport to environmental receptors prior to the end of ICs 
(DOE Idaho, 2007; Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).   
However, more recent studies have demonstrated the potential for waste packages to not just 
remain structurally stable but also hydraulically intact for extended periods of time (Rustick et 
al., 2016).  This allows leachate to build up within the waste packages of the waste zone, and 
could have profound impacts on overall NSDF performance.  Thus, better estimates of the actual 
performance of waste packages are needed to assess the impacts on leachate buildup caused by 
changes in facility infiltration.  
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Before analyzing leachate buildup, the process of waste package corrosion needs to be 
considered.  Most modern waste packages used by the DOE are carbon steel boxes.  In moist 
soils, buried iron and steel containers will commonly corrode over time from the formation of 
pits that grow into the metal surface (Mansfeld, 1987; Bradford, 2000).  The US National Bureau 
of Standards (NBS) published an authoritative study on corrosion of metals in different types of 
soils in 1957.  One finding by the authors was that corrosion of iron was dependent on soil 
corrosivity and soil aeration (Romanoff, 1957).  Soil corrosivity determines the initial rate of 
corrosion, while aeration properties of the soil determines the change in the corrosion rate over 
time.  Additional work was published by Mughabghab and Sullivan in 1989, confirming the 
results of the NBS study for carbon steels (Mughabghab and Sullivan, 1989).  Both studies 
showed that the rate of corrosion drops abruptly over time in well-drained and well-aerated soils 
containing large soil grains and close proximity to the soil surface.  Deeper soil layers and those 
containing higher fractions of clays with poor drainage showed corrosion rates that slowed much 
less aggressively. 
Using an integrated systems approach, we looked at the performance of waste packages in a 
humid environment under three different infiltration situations: past DOE practices, current DOE 
disposal methods, and a proposed future disposal practice.  Each of these three situations varies 
the time of installation of the more robust interim cover over the simpler operational cover.  The 
resulting calculated leachate buildup and release at the time of waste package hydraulic failure 




5.3 Analyzing Waste Package Performance 
A hypothetical cover and waste package analysis was developed based on the current disposal 
practices for the Engineered Trenches (ET) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) (Westinghouse 
Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008; Hamm et al., 2013).  Each ET disposal facility is 
approximately 198 m long by 46 m wide, with a depth ranging from 4.88 m to 7.62 m 
(Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), 2008).  For our analysis, we assumed 
dimensions of 198 m long by 46 m wide by a constant depth of 6.5 m for a hypothetical trench.   
A carbon steel box typical of DOE waste packages (termed a “B-25” box) was used for this 
analysis.  Box dimensions were 1.17 m by 1.83 m by a height of 1.19 m, yielding a total volume 
of 2.55 m3 (Jones and Li, 2001; Dunn, 2002; Jones and Phifer, 2002).  Box walls were 2.78 mm 
thick (Dunn, 2002).  Boxes were stacked four high with a total height of 5.28 m including risers  
(see Figure 5.1) (Phifer and Wilhite, 2001).  Based on the hypothetical trench described above, 
the resulting waste zone would contain approximately 17,000 B-25 boxes.  To provide a year to 
year comparison of waste disposal across the hypothetical trench, we assumed that disposal of 
the 17,000 boxes occurred over the span of 12 years, the current estimate for filling an actual ET 
(Hamm et al., 2013).  An equivalent number of waste packages were disposed in each year, 
resulting in 1,417 waste packages consisting of 354 stacks of four.  
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Figure 5.1:  Stacked B-25 boxes within a generic disposal facility (Jones and Li, 2001). 
To estimate the installation of cover layers, we specified an operational cover consisting of a 
layer of compacted soil 1.22 m thick that was placed over each section of waste zone, once that 
section was full.  The soil cover was contoured to promote runoff, and reduced the infiltration 
rate into the waste zone from natural annual precipitation (at SRS this is 1,220 mm/yr) to 286 
mm/yr (Hang et al., 2005; Hang et al., 2008).  Once the entire trench was considered full, the 
operational period was deemed to have ended and a high-density polyethylene (HDPE) 
geomembrane was installed over the operational soil cover.  The combination soil/geomembrane 
layers are known as the  “interim cover.”  Infiltration through the interim cover into the waste 
zone was estimated to be 10 mm/yr based on literature values developed for the 2004 SRS E-
Area closure plan (Hang et al., 2005). 
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Since void space within waste packages at Savannah River is highly variable (between 10 – 90 
percent), we followed the practice of using 50 percent as an average void space, as used by 
Savannah River staff in their analysis documents (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  A waste package 
with an absolute volume of 2.55 m3 would then have a maximum potential liquid volume of 
1,280 L.  Fill rates for stacks of buried B-25 boxes were shown to be variable from an 
exhumation study conducted in 2002 by Kerry Dunn at Savannah River (Dunn, 2002).  Since the 
Dunn study only contained a stack of two boxes, an extrapolation of the study’s findings was 
required to estimate fill rates for a stack of four boxes. 
A footprint area of 2.14 m2 for one stack of B-25 boxes and annual infiltration of 286 mm/yr 
through compacted native soil (equivalent to an operational soil cover) results in a total volume 
of infiltration though that soil of 610 L/yr.  Of the 610 L, the Dunn study provided a fill rate of 
160 L/yr for box one (the uppermost box) and 80 L/yr for box two, which for box two was close 
to 18 percent of the total annual infiltration minus the amount of liquid that was collected by box 
one.  Extrapolating from these findings gave a fill rate of 67 L/yr for box three and 55 L/yr for 
box four.  Boxes three and four were also estimated to collect 18 percent of the remaining 
available infiltration.  The remainder of the infiltration liquid was assumed to discharge to the 
underlying soil.   
To estimate changes in fill rates when a waste box became full of liquid, we assumed that 
overflow from a full box was available to fill all underlying boxes at the same 18 percent of 
available liquid as estimated within the previous section.  The resulting fill rates were 110 L/yr 
for box two, 90 L/yr for box three, and 74 L/yr for box four.  As before, the remaining L/yr of 
infiltrating water exited the bottom of the waste zone.   
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Once the operational period had ended at 12 years, we assumed that an interim cover was 
immediately installed.  The liquid fill rate for all boxes subsequently received a proportional 
reduction related to the decrease from 286 mm/yr to 10 mm/yr for total infiltration.  At 10 mm/yr 
total infiltration over 2.14 m2 is 21.4 L/yr.  For box one this produced a fill rate of 5.6 L/yr, box 
two 2.8 L/yr, box three 2.3 L/yr, and box four 1.9 L/yr.  Once box one was filled with liquid, the 
fill rate increased for box two to 3.9 L/yr, for box three to 3.2 L/yr, and for box four to 2.6 L/yr 
based on the resulting proportional increase of available infiltration.  If a situation occurred 
where both box one and two were filled, then the fill rate for box three would rise to 3.9 L/yr and 
for box four to 3.2 L/yr.  Waste package fill rates are summarized in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Waste Package Liquid Fill Rates by Time Period 
  Fill Rate in L/yr 
  Operational Period  IC Period 
Box  Base Fill Rate Box 1 is Full 
Box 1 and 
2 are Full  
Base Fill 
Rate 
Box 1 is 
Full 
Box 1 
and 2 are 
Full 
1  160    5.6   
2  80 110   2.8 3.9  
3  67 90 110  2.3 3.2 3.9 
4  55 74 90  1.9 2.6 3.2 
 
5.3.1  Corrosion Scenarios and Infiltration Situations 
Two corrosion cases were considered for this analysis, a constant corrosion rate and a 
diminishing corrosion rate.  Release of liquid from each box, to be defined as leachate, was 
assumed to occur when a pit on the face of a box had fully corroded through, resulting in a hole 
through which liquid was able to leave the box.  The bottom of the box was chosen as the failure 
point for all waste packages, as this was the box face with the highest corrosion potential as a 
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result from the removal of paint and primer during box transportation, as demonstrated within 
Dunn (see Figure 5.2) (Dunn, 2002; Jones and Phifer, 2002).  All leachate was assumed to flow 
from the waste package at the time of failure. 
 
Figure 5.2: Picture of B-25 box bottom exhumed from the 2002 Dunn study.  The scrape marks between the risers 
from forklift transport have removed both paint and primer layers, exposing bare steel (Dunn, 2002). 
For the constant corrosion case, a corrosion rate of 0.066 mm/yr (2.6 mils/yr) was used based on 
extrapolated results from the 2002 Dunn study.  Corrosion rates for the diminishing corrosion 
case (decreasing corrosion rates with time) were calculated based on the NBS report (Romanoff, 
1957; Jones and Phifer, 2002).  The NBS study developed an equation for rate of corrosion that 
followed a power law (equation 1) (Romanoff, 1957): 
ℎ! = 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡!  (1) 
hm = maximum pit depth, in mils;  
k = site dependent soil corrosivity fitting parameter, in mils/yr;  
t = time, in years; 
n = soil aeration dependent fitting parameter  
Four scenarios were examined for each of the two corrosion cases.  The scenarios were set up 
with two phases, an operational phase, during which the waste zone remained exposed to the 
atmosphere, and an IC phase during which the waste zone was sealed.  In the first scenario, 
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considered to be the base scenario, the corrosion fitting parameter k and aeration parameter n 
were both kept at the values estimated by SRS staff (Jones and Phifer, 2002).  An aeration value 
n of 0.32 was selected from the NBS study for the operational phase and the SRS value of 0.8 
was chosen for the IC period.  The second scenario contained a mix of SRS and NBS findings.  
The third scenario considered a hypothetical environment that was more corrosive than the SRS 
environment.  The fourth scenario was designed to observe the effects of using a more robust 
waste package compared to the 12-gauge B-25 box.  Further explanations of these scenarios and 
their justifications can be found in Rustick et al. 2016 and Table 5.2 (Rustick et al., 2016).  Table 
5.3 shows the values for k and n that were used in our analysis. 
Table 5.2: Corrosion Scenario Descriptions (Rustick et al., 2016) 
Scenario #  
1 
Base Case: SRS values used for all parameters (with the exception of “good” soil 
aeration, which was not considered by SRS staff) 
  
2 
Mix of SRS and NBS: SRS k and n values kept for “very poorly” aerated soils; 
NBS k and n values used for “good” aerated soils.  k values for “good” soil 
aeration were doubled to reflect results of NBS study 
  
3 
Higher Corrosivity:  Corrosivity fitting parameters doubled for “good” and “very 
poorly” aerated soils to reflect an environment more corrosive to carbon steel; SRS 
soil was estimated to be on the lower range of soil corrosivity compared to soils 
from the NBS study. 
  
4 
More Robust Waste Package:  k and n values were kept identical to scenario 2; 
the waste package wall thickness was increased from 12 to 10 gauge steel to reflect 
a hypothetical change to waste package procurement (such a change has already 
occurred once) 
 
Table 5.3: k, n, and Wall Thickness Values Used (Rustick et al., 2016) 
 
Scenario # 
 1  2  3  4 
k good  2.6  5.2  10.4  5.2 
k poor  2.6  2.6  5.2  2.6 




 1  2  3  4 
n poor  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
Wall Thickness in mils  109  109  109  141 
Using the data from the four corrosion scenarios for the constant and diminishing corrosion case, 
three infiltration situations were modeled across all 12 waste zones to provide estimates of the 
amount of leachate that would be released following the hydraulic failure of each waste zone.  It 
was assumed that holes developed in all four waste boxes in any given waste stack at once, and 
that all of the leachate contained in the waste packages was immediately available to the vadose 
zone.  The base case infiltration situation modeled current practice at Savannah River, where a 
NSDF remains open for 12 years before installation of an interim cover (Hamm et al., 2013).  
The second infiltration situation was based on past practices of a 25-year operational period at 
Savannah River.  In this situation, a NSDF would become full after 12 years but would remain 
with only an operational soil cover until the entire waste site (multiple NSDFs) was completely 
full before installation of an interim cover.  The third infiltration situation represents a proposed 
future suggested practice, where a geomembrane or other low permeability cover is placed over a 
waste zone immediately after that zone is completed.  This would limit infiltration into the waste 
zone to the fill rates present during the IC period (see Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4: Infiltration Situations 
Situation #  
1 
Current Practice: The operational period lasts for 12 years, followed by the 
installation of an interim cover 
  
2 
Past Practice: The operational period lasts for 25 years, followed by the 
installation of an interim cover 
  
3 
Proposed Future Suggested Practice:  Installation of a geomembrane (or other 
low permeability cover method) immediately after waste burial; each zone of waste 
get interim-style cover fill rates 
	 99	
5.4 Results 
The time to hydraulic failure for all waste packages in a given zone of waste was calculated for 
each corrosion scenario and is presented in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5: Time to Hydraulic Failure for Waste Packages under Corrosion Scenarios 
Corrosion Scenario  1 2 3 4 
  C S C S C S C S 
Waste 
Emplacement Zone  Time in Years 
1  42 111.4 31 104.6 10.5 44.8  43 143.7 
2  43 111.6 33 105 12 45.2 45 144.1 
3  44 111.8 35 105.5 14 45.5 47 144.6 
4  45 112 37 105.9 16 45.9 49 145.1 
5  46 112.3 39 106.4 18 46.3 51 145.6 
6  47 112.5 41 107 20 46.8 53 146.2 
7  48 112.9 43 107.6 22 47.3 55 146.9 
8  49 113.2 45 108.3 24 47.9 57 147.7 
9  50 1143.7 47 109.2 26 48.6 59 148.6 
10  51 114. 49 110.3 28 49.5 61 149.7 
11  52 115 51 111.8 30 50.8 63 151.4 
12  53 118.2 53 118.2 32 56.1 65 158.2 
 
Using the data from the four corrosion scenarios, three analyses were cacluated for each of the 
three infiltration situations.  Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 represent the maximum stored leachate 
potential for each waste zone in L.  These figures are not related to years, but instead show the 
leachate that has built up at the time of hydrualic failiure for each waste zone.  Figures 5.6, 5.7, 
and 5.8 show the leachate released upon hydrualic failure per waste zone, however these figures 
are represented in releation to the year of zone 1 hydrualic failure.  Figues 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 are 
also presented in relation to the year of zone 1 hydaulic failure, and show the flux of leachate in 






















































































































































































































































Results from the waste package infiltration analysis revealed several important factors that 
should be taken into account by site staff at current NSDFs and for any planned NSDFs.  By 
extending the operational period for little over a decade, which is not uncommon when 
considering delays or changes to waste disposal campaigns in the past (such as at the Idaho 
RWMC (DOE Idaho, 2013)), a majority of the waste zones become completely filled with liquid.  
The consequences of such a large amount of leachate remaining within the waste zone of a 
NSDF have not been studied within DOE PAs and could provide a significant driver for 
divergence of actual NSDF performance from estimated performance. 
When an interim cover is installed directly after placement of waste within the NSDF, our 





























factor of two from infiltration situation one.  There are a wide variety of impermeable covers that 
have been used across the DOE complex, so that a solution for a given site-specific environment 
should be readily available (Cook et al., 2004).  The main downside to installing such a cover, in 
addition to cost, would be the loss of a working surface for heavy machinery, as the equipment 
could potentially damage the interim cover.  
The next step in the refinement of the integrated system of components framework is to address 
some of the inherent uncertainty that has not been considered in this article.  In particular, 
infiltration rates and corrosion rates were presented as single deterministic values, when under 
real world conditions these values could be expected to vary based on a number of 
environmental factors.  One potential improvement would be to develop probability distributions 
for steel corrosion rates and annual precipitation.  This could be achieved through the use of 
natural analogs from other industries or studies coupled with a statistical tool such as a Monte 
Carlo analysis to provide a more complete understanding of potential waste zone conditions. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Our analysis of a LLW NSDF in a humid environment has shown the effects of different 
engineered cover designs and installations dates on the accumulation of leachate within the waste 
zone of the NSDF.  The effects of extending the operational period from 12 to 25 years were 
shown to increase the amount of stored leachate for most waste zones to the maximum potential 
stored leachate.  Installation of an interim cover over buried waste zones immediately, instead of 
waiting for the entire NSDF to be full, reduced total stored leachate by at least a factor of 2.  
Going forward, additional study is needed to assess the effects of uncertainty in the corrosion 
rates of waste packages on leachate releases to the environment.
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CHAPTER 6 
 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
6.1  Conclusions 
The work presented in this dissertation has centered around the merits of using an integrated 
system of components approach developed to aid the assessment and analysis of the performance 
of both current and future NSDFs.  In chapter 3, each of the five major DOE disposal sites were 
looked at through the lens of an integrated system of components.  The information was 
presented in a way to provide a broad overview of the current state of disposal practices, and all 
of the parameters that would be needed to compare each NSDF from a system of component 
framework.  The goal was to show that each site was different and contained different challenges 
to meeting the required performance objectives, yet all sites could be looked at from a common 
unified assessment framework. 
In chapter 4, one of the three system components, the waste component, was analyzed in detail to 
assess the effects of corrosion on waste package performance.  As a past practice, staff within the 
DOE did not take into account the barrier effects of individual waste packages.  Rather, they 
assumed that all waste packages failed by the end of the IC period.  This assumption causes all of 
the COPC to be released from the waste packages and be available to the vadose zone as a source 
term immediately at the end of the IC period.  Some recent work by the DOE at Savannah River 
addressed the performance of waste packages, but their focus was on the structural stability of 
the waste packages.  The study presented in this chapter was focused on the ability of intact 
waste packages to retain liquid for extended periods of time, with a later release of liquid to the 
vadose zone.  The accompanying analysis showed that under certain corrosion conditions, waste 
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packages could be expected to remain hydraulically intact past the 100-year IC period, 
potentially causing performance issues upon final closure of the NSDF. 
In chapter 5, the analysis conducted within chapter 4 was expanded to include waste package 
corrosion over the entire waste zone (chapter 4 only considered zone 1 and zone 12 as a 
bounding analysis).  Once a complete corrosion profile of the waste zone was established, a 
leachate model was created that could show the full extent of leachate to be expected to remain 
in the waste zone, and could also calculate the subsequent release of leachate from the waste 
zone due to the hydraulic failure of waste packages under the corrosion scenarios developed for 
chapter 4.  This model was then applied to three different infiltration situations based off of past, 
current, and proposed future installations of operational and interim cover systems over recently 
buried waste packages.   
Based on the results provided in this thesis, there are several broad conclusions that can be 
drawn.  For currently operating disposal facilities, the amount of time a waste zone sits under an 
operational cover vs. a more robust interim cover can have a marked increase on the amount of 
stored leachate within the waste zone.  With the assumption of a 25-year operational period, the 
amount of leachate estimated within the waste zone over current practices was over 200 percent 
higher.  Thus, installing an interim cover over a completed waste zone is recommended as soon 
as it is possible for all future NSDFs. 
For future planned disposal facilities, it would be useful to consider eliminating all future 
subsidence and leachate potential from corroding steel waste packages by filling the waste 
packages with grout before disposal.  The grout would provide structural stability for the waste 
zone over hundreds of years, would immobilize disposed waste within a bulk matrix, and would 
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prevent infiltrating liquid from contacting waste within the waste packages.  In addition, the high 
pH environment of the grout means that as waste packages begin to corrode and waste leachates 
from the waste packages, the grout will cause the dissolved radionuclides in the leachate to 
precipitate out of solution and further retard their movement to the vadose zone. 
Finally, for both current and future disposal facilities, leachate movement through the waste zone 
and into the vadose zone is a good target for performance monitoring.  The composition of the 
liquid leaving the bottom of the disposal facility could provide a number of indicators on 
conditions within the facility, such as corrosion rates, leachate generation rates, waste package 
performance, and engineered cover performance. 
6.2  Recommendations for Future Study 
The work presented in this dissertation has helped to advance the use of an integrated system of 
components approach and provide insight into NSDF waste zone conditions that have not 
previously been considered.  The next step is to expand the usefulness of the developed tools and 
analyses by considering uncertainty in the corrosion rates for the steel waste packages.  The 
environment within the waste zone is subject to many different processes that were simplified for 
this dissertation.  Any number of variables affecting soil corrosivity or aeration could have a 
profound impact on the presented results.  Instead of choosing a single deterministic value for a 
corrosion rate, it would be useful to consider a distribution of corrosion rates to allow for 
uncertainty within a waste package analysis.  Future work could include the use of statistical 
analysis, such as Monte Carlo analysis, to help define the uncertainty within the waste zone.  
This in turn would help to better identify the performance divers within the waste component of 
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